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I. INTRODUCTION 
Throughout history, scholars and practitioners have struggled to define the 
political concept generally referred to as democracy. That exasperation in 
seeking a definition for democracy is evidenced in Schweinitz’s statement that 
“[d]emocracy is one of those troublesome words which means all things to all 
people.”1 He continues and states that “[l]ike motherhood and patriotism, [de-
mocracy] is thought to be a noble condition and so is evoked by politicians, 
publicists, preachers, and demagogues to prove their unsullied intentions and 
just claim to popular support.”2 Part of the reason for the confusion in what 
democracy really is, is derived, at least partly, from the way the word is used, 
particularly by politicians who seek to convince their citizens, as well as the 
global society that their countries are bastions of democracy. For example, 
during the existence of East Germany (1949–1990), which was part of the 
Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact, the country was often referred to as the Ger-
man Democratic Republic. Then, there are today’s Democratic People’s Re-
public of Korea (DPRK) and the Democratic Republic of Congo. It is difficult 
to find any institution or organization that studies democracy and democratic 
governments that would consider any of these countries as democratic or as 
possessing fully functioning democratic institutions.3 
Certain values and characteristics have the power to make, break or define 
a democracy. Adherence or fidelity to the rule of law is one of them and it is 
an important foundation on which democracy is built; it is not only the heart 
and soul of a democratic society, but without it, members of society would 
find it very difficult to live together peacefully. For example, in Africa, in 
order to effectively manage the conflicting interests of the diverse subcultures 
that inhabit each country, “all citizens, regardless of their political, economic, 
and ethnocultural affiliation, must be subject to the law.”4 Regardless of what 
an African country calls itself, it cannot be said to be democratic or practicing 
democratic governance if the majority of its citizens consider themselves 
above the law or do not voluntarily adhere to the rule of law. A governing 
process characterized or undergirded by the rule of law is the key to peaceful 
coexistence and development in Africa. Such a governing process is also the 
foundation on which a democracy is built. 
During the last several decades, many African countries have suffered 
from a variety of political and economic problems. Some of these problems 
 
 1 KARL DE SCHWEINITZ, JR., INDUSTRIALIZATION AND DEMOCRACY: ECONOMIC 
NECESSITIES AND POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES 12 (1964). 
 2 Id. 
 3 See John Mukum Mbaku, Corruption and Democratic Institutions in Africa, 27 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 310, 331 (2018). 
 4 John Mukum Mbaku, Kenyan Democracy and the Rule of Law, GEO. J. INT’L AFF. 
(March 28, 2018), https://www.georgetownjournalofinternationalaffairs.org/online-edition 
/2018/3/28/kenyan-democracy-and-the-rule-of-law. 
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include, but are not limited to, government impunity; military intervention in 
politics; extreme poverty, especially among historically vulnerable groups 
(e.g., women, infants and children; ethnic and religious minorities); ethnic-
induced violence, some of which has deteriorated into civil wars; massive 
abuse of human rights, including genocide and ethnic cleansing; abuse and 
exploitation of children, including their use (i) in the production of pornogra-
phy, (ii) as “child soldiers” in various conflicts, (iii) “slaves” in fetish shrines 
or beggars on the streets of various cities, (iv) as sources of organs for the 
international organ transplantation market, (v) sexual slaves in the sex-tour-
ism industry; and many more.5 
True, African countries have a lot of political and economic problems. 
Nevertheless, they also have the potential to deal fully and effectively with all 
of them. Take extreme poverty, for example. Available data show that in 2018, 
as many as 91.16 million people in Nigeria were living in extreme poverty.6 
In June 2018, researchers at the Washington, D.C.-based think tank, The 
Brookings Institution, determined that Nigeria had overtaken India as the 
country with the largest number of people living in extreme poverty in the 
world.7 By 2030, the number of Nigerians living in extreme poverty is ex-
pected to rise to 120 million, representing 45.5% of the national population.8 
Even though Nigeria is one of the countries with the highest population of 
people living in extreme poverty, Nigeria is also endowed with significant 
amounts of natural resources, including large reserves of oil and gas.9 Since 
the 1970s, the country has received significant amounts of revenues from the 
export of its natural resources.10 These revenues could have been invested by 
the government in public programs that are pro-poor and capable of providing 
 
 5 See, e.g., John Mukum Mbaku, The Rule of Law and the Exploitation of Children in 
Africa, 42 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 287, 287 (2019) (examining conditions leading 
to the abuse and exploitation of children in Africa); see generally John Mukum Mbaku, 
International Law and the Struggle Against Government Impunity in Africa, 42 HASTINGS 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 73 (2019) (examining the persistence of government impunity in 
Africa and how to eradicate it) [hereinafter Mbaku, Struggle Against Impunity]. 
 6 See Emmanuel Okogba, 91 Million Nigerians Now Live in Extreme Poverty—World 
Poverty Clock, VANGUARD (Feb. 16, 2019), https://www.vanguardngr.com/2019/02/91-mi 
llion-nigerians-now-live-in-extreme-poverty-world-poverty-clock/. 
 7 Homi Kharas, Kristofer Hamel & Martin Hofer, The Start of a New Narrative, 
BROOKINGS INST. (June 19, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2 
018/06/19/the-start-of-a-new-poverty-narrative/; see also Yomi Kazeem, Nigeria Has Be-
come the Poverty Capital of the World, QUARTZ AFRICA (June 25, 2018), https://qz.com/afr 
ica/1313380/nigerias-has-the-highest-rate-of-extreme-poverty-globally/. 
 8 The Percentage of Nigerians Living in Extreme Poverty Could Increase by 2030, 
WORLD POVERTY CLOCK (2018), https://worldpoverty.io/blog/index.php?r=12. 
 9 Ruth Maclean, Violence in Cameroon’s Anglophone Regions ‘Spiraling Out of Con-
trol,’ GUARDIAN (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/18/camer 
oon-amnesty-election-violence-anglophone-regions. 
 10 Id. 
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those living in extreme poverty with the opportunity for self-actualization. So, 
why did Nigerian authorities not devote these enormous revenues to poverty-
alleviation efforts? In an interview in 2012, former World Bank Vice Presi-
dent Dr. Oby Ezekwesili, herself a Nigerian and co-founder of Transparency 
International (the Berlin-based anti-corruption non-governmental organiza-
tion), indicated that Nigeria had “lost more than $400 billion to oil thieves 
since she attained independence in 1960.”11 Dr. Ezekwesili went on to say that 
“as much as 20 percent of the entire budget for capital expenditure in Nigeria 
ended in private pockets annually” and noted that “whereas oil accounts for 
about 90 percent of the value of Nigeria’s exports, over 80 percent of the fund 
ends up in the hands of one percent of the country’s population.”12 In other 
words, extreme poverty in Nigeria is not due to the fact that the country does 
not have the resources to deal with it. The problem lies in the fact that, over 
the years, the country’s civil servants and political elites have squandered and 
mismanaged the resources that could have been used to invest in human de-
velopment. As stated by Antony Goldman: 
Nigeria has earned around $400bn from oil since 1970. A Ni-
gerian friend returning home after 15 years abroad asked 
where the war had been—so run down and dilapidated had the 
country become. And yet Nigerians own some of the finest 
properties in the world’s best cities, and swell some of the 
world’s biggest bank accounts.13 
Nigeria, of course, is not the only African country that has squandered its 
development potential through bureaucratic and other forms of corruption. 
During the last several decades, countries such as Angola, Cameroon, Equa-
torial Guinea, Gabon, and, of course, Nigeria, have received significant reve-
nues from the sale of oil but virtually all of these revenues have “been squan-
dered and fritted away in conspicuous consumption” by a few privileged civil 
servants and political elites, leaving significant numbers of citizens sweltering 
in extreme poverty.14 
Many studies have been devoted to determining why several African coun-
tries, including even those with significant endowments of natural and human 
resources, have failed to improve the quality of life for their citizens. Some of 
the reasons advanced to explain the continued existence of a major 
 
 11 See Ikechukwu Nnochiri, Nigeria Loses $400 Bn to Oil Thieves—Ezekwesili, 
VANGUARD (Aug. 28, 2012), https://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/08/nigeria-loses-400bn- 
to-oil-thieves-ezekwesili/. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Antony Goldman, Who Benefits from Africa’s Oil? BBC NEWS (Mar. 9, 2004), http://n 
ews.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3542901.stm. 
 14 See GEORGE B. N. AYITTEY, AFRICA UNCHAINED: THE BLUEPRINT FOR AFRICA’S 
FUTURE 34 (2005). 
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underdevelopment trap in many African countries characterized by huge 
pockets of extreme poverty, include: (1) the pervasive nature of bureaucratic 
and political corruption; (2) the failure of many of these countries to effec-
tively manage diversity, which has allowed a majority faction15 to tyrannize 
minority ethnic and religious groups; (3) violent and destructive mobilization 
by subcultures that have been marginalized or perceive themselves to be mar-
ginalized by public policies—in some countries, this mobilization has deteri-
orated into civil wars;16 (4) unmanageable external debts; (5) continued de-
pendence of African countries on their former colonizers for trade, 
development, and food aid; (6) intervention by the military in national poli-
tics; (7) a global market that discriminates against African business interests; 
 
 15 Such a faction is usually made up of one or more ethnocultural groups that monopolize 
and control the political system, as well as major sectors of the economy. In doing so, such 
a majority faction marginalizes the minority and forces the latter to live in extreme poverty 
on the economic margins. For example, since unification between the English-speaking 
and French-speaking regions of the erstwhile German colony of Kamerun in 1961, the 
country’s government has been dominated by the Francophones. The latter have controlled 
the political and economic systems of the Republic of Cameroon, to the exclusion of the 
country’s Anglophone Regions. In late-2016, teachers and lawyers in the Anglophone Re-
gions took to the streets to peacefully protest the continued marginalization of the Anglo-
phones. The central government responded to the peaceful protests with extreme brutality, 
killing thousands of people and burning down more than 300 Anglophone villages. As a 
consequence, radical Anglophone groups responded to the central government’s violence 
with violence of their own. As of this writing (2020), the country is embroiled in a bloody 
and “genocidal” conflict that is being compared to the Rwanda Genocide of 1994. See, e.g., 
Kwasi Gyamfi Asiedu & Commentary, Cameroon’s “Quiet” Anglophone Crisis Keeps 
Escalating with Killings, Detentions Mounting, QUARTZ AFRICA (May 29, 2018), https://qz 
.com/africa/1291273/cameroons-anglophone-activists-say-unreported-killings-like-rwand 
a-genocide/ (arguing that activists in the Anglophone Regions of Cameroon are now com-
paring the massacre of thousands of Anglophones and the burning of their villages by gov-
ernment security forces to the Rwanda Genocide of 1994); see also John Mukum Mbaku, 
International Law and the Anglophone Problem in Cameroon: Federalism, Secession or 
the Status Quo?, 42 SUFFOLK TRANSNT’L L. REV. 1 (2019) (examining the violent struggle 
between the Anglophones and the Francophone-dominated central government in Came-
roon). 
 16 Recent examples include civil wars or ethnic-induced violence in Cameroon, the Cen-
tral African Republic, and South Sudan. See generally Maclean, supra note 9 (examining 
the violence between Anglophone separatists and the central government that has degen-
erated into the slaughter of thousands of civilians and the burning of many villages); Mor-
gan Winsor, South Sudan Marks 5 Years of Vicious Civil War, ABC NEWS (Dec. 15, 2018), 
https://abcnews.go.com/International/south-sudan-marks-years-vicious-civil-war/story?id 
=59797433 (noting that the civil war that started in South Sudan in 2013 remains quite 
active); Ewelina U. Ochab, The Religious War in the Central African Republic Continues, 
FORBES (May 9, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2018/05/09/the-religi 
ous-war-in-central-african-republic-continues/#19746c2f3c0d (noting the fighting be-
tween religious militias—mainly Muslim and Christian—in the Central African Republic). 
2020] THREATS TO THE RULE OF LAW IN AFRICA 299 
(8) excessive and unmanageable population growth; and (9) a chronic short-
age of physical and human capital.17 
In addition, it has been argued that “pervasive poverty in the continent is 
due either to mistakes made by well-intentioned policymakers or to the inept-
itude and incompetence of poorly educated and unskilled civil servants and 
politicians.”18 It has been argued, then, by some development economists, that 
emphasis should be placed “on the recruitment into the public services of Af-
rican countries, new leaders who are better trained and educated, have higher 
skills, and are more honest and disciplined, and have higher levels of integ-
rity.”19 
Research conducted during the last several decades, however, has shown 
that many of the “so-called policy mistakes committed in the African coun-
tries during the last several years were actually deliberate programs designed 
and advanced by opportunistic—but not necessarily poorly informed or un-
skilled—politicians and civil servants seeking ways to enrich themselves at 
the expense of the rest of society.”20 In fact, research has determined that in 
many African countries, “civil servants actually intentionally and deliberately 
impose various bottlenecks where none existed before with the expectation 
that entrepreneurs, afraid that these bottlenecks would increase their transac-
tion costs, would be willing to bribe the regulators to have them removed.”21 
In a study of corruption in Africa, B. Osei-Hwedei and K. Osei-Hwedei de-
termined that “when bottlenecks are created in the administration [i.e., gov-
ernment] within the sectors dealing with the public, they become a source of 
corruption”22 used by civil servants to extort money for themselves. In doing 
so, civil servants stunt economic growth and create an environment for the 
perpetuation of poverty, especially among historically vulnerable groups, 
such as women, youth, and religious and ethnic minorities. 
But, how were these state custodians (i.e., civil servants and political 
elites) able to undertake these perverse public policies without any pushback 
from civil society and its organizations? First, since independence, many Af-
rican countries have not been able to provide themselves with governing pro-
cesses that adequately constrain the state and guard the government against 
 
 17 See, e.g., JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 236–40 
(2004). 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 See John Mukum Mbaku, International Law and the Fight Against Bureaucratic Cor-
ruption in Africa, 33 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 661, 680 n. 94 (2016). 
 22 See Bertha Z. Osei-Hwedie & Kwaku Osei-Hwedie, The Political, Economic, and 
Cultural Bases of Corruption in Africa, in CORRUPTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: 
LESSONS FROM COUNTRY CASE-STUDIES 40, 44 (Kempe R. Hope, Sr. & Bornwell C. 
Chikulo eds., 2000). 
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such behaviors as corruption and rent seeking.23 In fact, the laws and institu-
tions that many African countries adopted at independence actually created 
imperial presidencies and empowered many politicians and civil servants with 
significant levels of discretion, which they used to plunder national resources 
for their own benefit and that of their supporters, the majority of whom are 
usually members of the subculture to whom the politician or civil servant be-
longs.24 
Second, in several countries, military elites intervened in politics, claiming 
that they intended to save their countries from incompetent and opportunistic 
civilian governors.25 For example, when the military overthrew the govern-
ment of Nigeria’s First Republic in 1966, one of the coup leaders, Major C. 
Kaduna Nzeogwu, claimed that they had done so in order to save Nigerians 
and their hard-fought independence from the “tribalists” and “nepotists” who 
had squandered the country’s development potential through their corrupt ac-
tivities.26 He went on to state that the military wanted to assure “every law 
abiding citizen [of Nigeria] . . . freedom from fear and all forms of oppression, 
freedom from general inefficiency and freedom to live and strive in every field 
of human endeavor, both nationally and internationally.”27 
Nigeria’s coup leaders, as was the case with their counterparts in other 
African countries, did not keep their promises. Instead, they plundered their 
economies for their personal benefit, abused the rights of their fellow citizens, 
and promoted policies that stunted economic growth and development, as well 
any efforts to institutionalize the rule of law and constitutional government.28 
The Nigerian military, which ruled the country during the periods 1966–1979 
and 1993–1999, committed many atrocities against their fellow citizens.29 
 
 23 John Mukum Mbaku, Bureaucratic Corruption in Africa: The Futility of Cleanups, 
16 CATO J. 99, 100 (Spring/Summer 1996). 
 24 For example, since Paul Biya became President of the Republic of Cameroon in 1982, 
his Beti/Bulu ethnic group from the South Region of the country has held most of the key 
senior positions in government and dominate “state-owned businesses, and security 
forces.” See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2018 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: 
CAMEROON (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-country-reports-on-huma 
n-rights-practices/cameroon. 
 25 See, e.g., Victor T. Le Vine, The Fall and Rise of Constitutionalism in West Africa, 
35 J. MOD. AFRI. STUD. 181 (1997) (examining the impact of military coups on constitu-
tionalism in several countries in West Africa). 
 26 See Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, Announcing Nigeria’s First Military Coup 




 27 Id. 
 28 See, e.g., Claire Felter, Africa’s ‘Leaders for Life’, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Apr. 
29, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/africas-leaders-life. 
 29 How First Coup Still Haunts Nigeria 50 Years On, BBC NEWS (Jan. 15, 2016), https:// 
2020] THREATS TO THE RULE OF LAW IN AFRICA 301 
Despite the claim that their more disciplined training would make them more 
effective governors, their reign was marked by extremely high levels of self-
dealing, public financial malpractices, abuse of fundamental rights, and a sig-
nificant level of tyranny directed at civilians.30 
Of course, Nigeria was not the only country in Africa whose military had 
taken over control of the government. On July 23, 1952, the government of 
King Farouk of Egypt was overthrown by members of the Free Officers 
Movement.31 Since the 1952 military intervention in the country’s political 
system, Africa has encountered “at least 200 successful and failed coups.”32 
However, by the mid-1990s 
especially after South Africa’s successful transition from the 
racially-based apartheid system to a multi-racial and demo-
cratic political dispensation, many Africans came to see mul-
tiparty democracy and constitutionalism as the only legitimate 
way to change government, as well as to enhance and ensure 
peaceful coexistence and minimize sectarian conflict.33  




 30 No event illustrates the cruelty and the recklessness of military rule in Nigeria more 
than the brutal execution of Ken Saro Wiwa, a human rights activist and leader of the 
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni Peoples (MOSOP) and eight other Ogoni activists. 
See, e.g., Ifeanyi O. Onwuazombe, Human Rights Abuse and Violations in Nigeria: A Case 
Study of the Oil-Producing Communities in the Niger Delta Region, 22 ANNUAL SURVEY 
OF INT’L & COMP. L. 115, 123 (2017) (examining the execution, by the military, of the 
human rights activist, Ken Saro Wiwa). 
 31 See JOEL GORDON, NASSER’S BLESSED MOVEMENT: EGYPT’S FREE OFFICERS AND THE 
JULY REVOLUTION 4 (1992) (examining the Egyptian military coup of 1952 and its after-
math). 
 32 See Yomi Kazeem, What is a Coup? These 40 African Countries Could Help Explain, 
QUARTZ AFRICA (Nov. 16, 2017), https://qz.com/africa/1130009/what-is-coup-zimbabwe- 
joins-40-african-countries-that-have-had-coups/. 
 33 John Mukum Mbaku, Constitutional Coups as a Threat to Democratic Governance 
in Africa, 2 INT’L COMP., POL’Y & ETHICS L. REV. 77, 90 (2018). It was this belief in mul-
tiparty democracy as a method for change of government that provided the impetus for the 
adoption of the adoption of the Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to 
Unconstitutional Changes of Government (hereinafter “Lomé Declaration”). The Lomé 
Declaration specifically rejected the military coup as a way to change the government. See 
Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Gov-
ernment, Lomé, Togo, July 10–12, 2000, O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI). 
 34 Recent coups in Africa include: Burkina Faso (2014), Egypt (2013), Sudan (2019), 
and Zimbabwe (2018). See generally What Was Behind the Coup in Burkina Faso?, BBC 
NEWS (Sept. 25, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34277045; Eliza Mack-
intosh, Zimbabwe’s Military Takeover was the World’s Strangest Coup, CNN (Nov. 21, 
2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/20/africa/zimbabwe-military-takeover-strangest-co 
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Le Vine has argued that of all the efforts to thwart or stunt the practice of 
constitutional government and the rule of law in Africa, the military coup 
d’état has been the most effective. He argued that military intervention in Af-
rican politics and the subsequent establishment of military regimes “epito-
mized the low estate to which constitutionalism had fallen during the 1963–
89” period in Africa.35 He argued further that: 
[n]ot only did they [i.e., the military regimes] commit acts 
which in themselves amply spoke to their disdain of the rule 
of law, but after taking power, they frequently suspended or 
discarded existing constitutions, to be removed from sight as 
offensive remnants of previous régimes, and then (more often 
than not in order to help legitimize their own rule) proceeded 
to write new ones to suit themselves.36 
Third, even in countries where there have not been successful military 
coups, peace and security have still been threatened.37 For example, South 
Sudan, one of the world’s and Africa’s youngest country, has been pervaded 
by ethnic-induced violence during most of its existence as an independent 
country.38 Violent mobilization by ethnic-based militias plunged the country 
into civil war in 2013 and as of this writing, the country has still not been able 
to extricate itself from this bloody confrontation.39 Not only has the continued 
violence in South Sudan crippled the economy but it has uprooted thousands 
of people, especially women and children, and created a hunger crisis that has 
put millions of citizens in danger of starvation.40 
In May 2015, there was a failed coup in Burundi.41 The attempted coup 
took place during the mass unrest that followed the announcement by the 
country’s president, Pierre Nkurunziza, that he would seek a third term in of-
fice even though he was constitutionally barred from doing so.42 Yet, despite 
its failure, tensions between President Nkurunziza’s ethnic Hutu majority and 
the Tutsi minority continued, forcing thousands of citizens, many Tutsi, to 
 
up/index.html; Sudan Coup: Why Omar al-Bashir Was Overthrown, BBC NEWS (Apr. 15, 
2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47852496. 
 35 Le Vine, supra note 25, at 190. 
 36 Id. 
 37 See Winsor, supra note 16. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Megan Specia & Kassie Bracken, In South Sudan, a Never-Ending Hunger Season 
Puts Millions in Danger, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/3 
0/world/africa/south-sudan-hunger-season.html. 
 41 Aryn Baker, Attempted Coup in Burundi Fails But Tensions Linger, TIME (May 15, 
2015), http://time.com/3859920/burundis-attempted-coup-fails/. 
 42 Id. 
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seek refuge in Rwanda.43 It has been four years since the violence started but 
it has not yet abated as Nkurunziza and his fellow ethnics continue to domi-
nate and control the government.44 In fact, in 2018, the country’s constitution 
was amended to significantly increase President Nkurunziza’s powers and al-
low him to potentially remain in office until 2034.45 
Fourth, in countries with imperial or reinforced presidencies, executives 
abused their powers and engaged in activities that stunted human develop-
ment, exacerbated inter-ethnic conflicts, failed to promote and enhance na-
tional integration and nation-building, and derailed any efforts to deepen and 
institutionalize democratic governance. As argued by Le Vine, these rein-
forced presidencies were found in “Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Maurita-
nia, and Cameroon.”46 In these countries, “elected legislative assemblies 
tended to be relegated to the role of a prebendiary pasturage, and their mem-
bers usually gave automatic assent to the initiatives of the ‘reinforced’ presi-
dencies.”47 The results of Le Vine’s research were published in 1997.48 Yet, 
as of this writing, these imperial presidencies remain and they continue to 
wield virtually unchecked or unguarded power.49 In a book published in 2006 
listing the world’s twenty worst living dictators, eight were in Africa and in-
cluded Paul Biya of Cameroon, the late Muammar al-Qaddafi of Libya, and 
the late Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe.50 
 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 See Burundi Backs New Constitution Extending Presidential Term Limits, AL 
JAZEERA (May 22, 2018), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2018/05/burundi-backs- 
constitution-extending-presidential-term-limits-180521134736408.html. 
 46 See Le Vine, supra note 25, at 189. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Charles Manga Fombad and Enyinna Nwauche, experts on constitutionalism in Af-
rica, argue that despite the constitutional amendments that took place in Cameroon in 1996, 
“the purported separation of powers [remains] purely symbolic” and the President of the 
Republic continues to dominate the legislature and control the judiciary. Charles Manga 
Fombad & Enyinna Nwauche, Africa’s Imperial Presidents: Immunity, Impunity and Ac-
countability, 5 AFR. J. LEGAL STUD. 91, 96 (2012). 
 50 DAVID WALLECHINSKY, TYRANTS: THE WORLD’S 20 WORST DICTATORS (2006) (list-
ing and examining the world’s twenty worst dictators). Qaddafi was killed during Libya’s 
civil war, which started in 2011; Biya remains the president of the Republic of Cameroon—
in fact, he was re-elected for a seventh term in elections held in 2018; and Mugabe was 
ousted by military coup in 2017. See, e.g., Eyong Blaise & Bukola Adebayo, Cameroon’s 
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Finally, in recent years, the constitutional coup has emerged as a major 
threat to “democratic institutions and individual liberty, as well as peaceful 
coexistence in the continent” [of Africa].51 But, what is the constitutional 
coup? It involves the amendment of the constitution either to eliminate presi-
dential term limits or other constraints (e.g., age limits or citizenship require-
ments) on the ability of the incumbent president to extend his or her man-
date.52 The constitutional coup can also involve the situation in which 
incumbent presidents amend or have the constitution amended to “invalidate 
the candidacies of their opponents, weaken the opposition, and guarantee re-
gime survival.”53 
In countries such as Cameroon, Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda, incumbent 
presidents have been able to change their constitutions, with the help of a 
compliant legislature, to remain in power indefinitely.54 In 2008, Paul Biya, 
who had been President of the Republic of Cameroon since 1982 and was 
constitutionally prohibited from running for another term in office, had a com-
pliant parliament amend the constitution to clear the way for him to stand for 
another term in office.55 After the constitution was amended, Biya ran for re-
election in the 2011 presidential election and won another seven year term in 
office with 77.99% of the vote.56 Most Cameroonians believed that he would 
step down after that term, having served 36 years in office.57 However, at the 
end of his term in 2018, he refused to leave office and again stood for another 
term.58 In an election marred by violence and the failure of voters in the coun-
try’s two Anglophone Regions to participate, Biya emerged as the winner and 
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is expected to remain in office until at least 2025, at which time, he would 
have been president of Cameroon continuously for forty-three years.59 
Studies of extreme poverty and underdevelopment in Africa now point to 
the absence or lack of governing processes that guarantee the rule of law as 
the main obstacle to peaceful coexistence and the creation of the wealth that 
the African countries need to deal fully and effectively with the various types 
of poverty.60 The behaviors listed above, such as military and constitutional 
coups, as well as high levels of corruption, are “manifestations of non-demo-
cratic governance systems.”61 In each of these African countries, the people, 
through their governments, have failed to provide themselves with governing 
processes undergirded by the rule of law. In fact, a governing process that 
guarantees the rule of law is also one that effectively constrains the state and 
guards against government impunity, majoritarian tyranny, and other forms of 
political opportunism that have exacerbated inter-ethnic conflict and stunted 
human development in many African countries.62 
E. A. Brett, a scholar of African political economy, has argued that the 
causes of extreme poverty and economic regression in Africa during the last 
several decades “are clearly structural rather than contingent, since break-
down is almost universal and cannot simply be attributed to particular national 
circumstances.”63 He continued that the causes of underdevelopment and ex-
treme poverty in Africa “must stem from the nature of the institutional ar-
rangements developed under colonialism and hastily modified during the po-
litical transition of the 1950s and 1960s.”64 
As argued by the late Douglass C. North,65 the Noble Laureate in econom-
ics, “it is the success and failures in human organization that account for the 
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progress and retrogression of societies.”66 Hence, the most important public 
policy priority for each African country is to make certain it has a governing 
process that adequately constrains the state and guards the government against 
the abuse of power. In other words, to enhance peaceful coexistence, eradicate 
extreme poverty, and promote human development, each African country 
must provide itself with a governing process undergirded by the rule of law. 
For, without adherence or fidelity to the rule of law, peace and security will 
be threatened, and there would be a general failure for countries to create the 
wealth that they need to confront extreme poverty and significantly improve 
the people’s quality of life. In the African countries, the rule of law is very 
important for stability and development. 
II. WHAT IS THE RULE OF LAW? 
A. Introduction 
 
Throughout the years, many legal and constitutional scholars have contrib-
uted to the definition of the rule of law.67 Among these scholars, British legal 
philosopher Albert Venn Dicey is one of the most important.68 The rule of law 
is “typically contrasted with arbitrary exercise of power.”69 The rule of law is 
supposed to “eliminate arbitrariness in the exercise of power,”70 a problem 
that is pervasive throughout many African countries.71 It has been argued that, 
despite the differences in how scholars and practitioners perceive the meaning 
of the rule of law, “the leading judicial and academic authorities on the rule 
of law subscribe to a common idea of the meaning of the principle. This core 
meaning is simply that the rule of law requires that individuals be protected 
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from arbitrary government.”72 E. C. S. Wade, in his “Introduction” to Dicey’s 
Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution,73 argued that while 
“the rule of law must not be conceived of as being linked to any particular 
technique,” it is important and “fundamental that there must exist some tech-
nique for forcing the Government to submit to the law.”74 He continued and 
stated that “if such a technique does not exist, the Government itself becomes 
the means whereby the law is achieved. This is the antithesis of the rule of 
law.”75 In other words, the law must be supreme. 
Wade reminded readers that “[t]here is no doubt that arbitrary power is to-
day resented and feared to an even greater extent than in the late nineteenth 
century in those States which retain their faith in a democratic form of gov-
ernment.”76 Thus, Wade continued, criticisms of some aspects of Dicey’s 
work “have been superseded by a revival of interest in the conception of the 
rule of law as being the antithesis to the arbitrary and despotic forms of gov-
ernment”77—these, of course, include those which, since the 1950s and 1960s, 
came into being in Africa. Finally, Wade provided a summary of what is today 
the general or common understanding of the concept of the rule of law: 
The rule of law presupposes the absence of arbitrary power 
and so gives the assurance that the individual can ascertain 
with reasonable certainty what legal powers are available to 
government if there is a proposal to affect his private rights. A 
person who takes the trouble to consult his lawyer ought to be 
able to ascertain the legal consequences of his own acts and 
what are the powers of others to interfere with those acts.78 
In his study of the law of the constitution, Dicey argued that an effective 
definition of the rule of law must embody three very important principles: (1) 
the law is supreme; (2) all citizens, regardless of their economic, political, or 
social position, are equal before the law; and (3) the rights of individuals, 
which are established through court decisions, must be accepted and re-
spected.79 Other scholars have since made additional contributions to defining 
and explaining the principle of the rule of law. For example, the late Rt. Hon. 
Lord Bingham of Cornhill KG, House of Lords, a well-respected and 
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distinguished British jurist and legal scholar, argued that “the core of the ex-
isting principle” of the rule of law is that “all persons and authorities within 
the state, whether public or private, should be bound by and entitled to the 
benefit of laws publicly and prospectively promulgated and publicly adminis-
tered in the courts.”80 
Some legal scholars have argued, however, that to effectively define the 
rule of law, one must distinguish between formal and substantive defini-
tions.81 Craig Stern argues that “[f]ormal definitions of the rule of law speak 
to the rules that are designed to constrain civil government and the courts.”82 
Substantive definitions of the rule of law, on the other hand, concern the extent 
to which these rules “embody principles of justice such as human rights.”83 
The late Anglo-Austrian economist and philosopher, Friedrich August von 
Hayek, provided a formal definition of the rule when he stated that: 
Nothing distinguishes more clearly conditions in a free coun-
try from those in a country under the arbitrary government than 
the observance in the former of the great principles known as 
the Rule of Law. Stripped of all technicalities this means that 
government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and an-
nounced beforehand—rules which make it possible to foresee 
with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive pow-
ers in given circumstances, and to plan one’s individual affairs 
on the basis of this knowledge. Though this ideal can never be 
perfectly achieved, since legislators as well as those to whom 
the administration of the law is [e]ntrusted are fallible men, the 
essential point, that the discretion left to the executive organs 
wielding coercive power should be reduced as much as possi-
ble, is clear enough. While every law restricts individual free-
dom to some extent by altering the means which people may 
use in the pursuit of their aims, under the Rule of Law the gov-
ernment is prevented from stultifying individual efforts by ad 
hoc action. Within the known rules of the game the individual 
is free to pursue his personal ends and desires, certain that the 
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powers of government will not be used deliberately to frustrate 
his efforts.84 
Von Hayek’s definition of the rule of law is formal because “it prescribes 
how law should operate generally rather than prescribing any particular con-
tent of the law.”85 According to this formal definition of the rule of law, “there 
is law formally enacted, and both state custodians (that is, government offi-
cials)86 and citizens are bound by and must abide by that law.”87 Professor 
Robert Stein argues that the most critical aspect of the rule of law is that “the 
law is superior, applies equally, is known and predictable, and is administered 
through a separation of powers.”88 
Where the rule of law functions properly, “no one, including senior civil 
servants and politicians, is above the law.”89 Thus, in such a society, all citi-
zens, “regardless of their economic and political status, are bound by and sub-
ject to the law.”90 This principle is very important, especially for countries in 
Africa where some people or population groups (e.g., Whites or people of 
European ancestry in apartheid South Africa; members of the ruling majority 
faction in several countries, like Cameroon) consider (or historically have 
considered) themselves above the law. Hence, for each African country, ad-
herence or fidelity to the rule of law implies that “one’s ethnic or racial . . . 
status should not have any bearing on how the law treats them—all persons 
are subject to the law and all persons are equal before the law.”91 
While the law must generally be known and understood by the people, it 
must also apply equally to all citizens, and in addition “must be that which the 
people can obey.”92 According to U.S. suffragist and women’s advocate, Eliz-
abeth Cady Stanton, “[t]o make laws that man can not and will not obey, 
serves to bring all law into contempt. It is very important in a republic, that 
the people should respect the laws, for if we throw them to the winds, what 
becomes of civil government?”93 Of course, in order for the rule of law to 
function properly and effectively, “there must be available mechanisms and 
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institutions that have the capacity to enforce the legal rules when they are 
breached, regardless of who breaches them.”94 
The substantive definition of the rule of law, unlike its formal counterpart, 
constrains the content of law. For example, Thomas Carothers argues: 
The rule of law can be defined as a system in which the laws 
are public knowledge, are clear in meaning, and apply equally 
to everyone. They enshrine and uphold the political and civil 
liberties that have gained status as universal human rights over 
the last half-century. In particular, anyone accused of a crime 
has the right to a fair, prompt hearing and is presumed innocent 
until proved guilty. The central institutions of the legal system, 
including courts, prosecutors, and police, are reasonably fair, 
competent, and efficient. Judges are impartial and independ-
ent, not subject to political influence or manipulation. Perhaps 
most important, the government is embedded in a comprehen-
sive legal framework, its officials accept that the law will be 
applied to their own conduct, and the government seeks to be 
law-abiding.95 
Carothers expanded the formal approach to the definition of the rule of law 
to link it to and emphasize the protection of human rights. With respect to 
African countries, it is important that national laws and constitutions96 accord 
with the provisions of international human rights instruments.97 But, why the 
emphasis on linking national constitutions and laws to the provisions of inter-
national human rights instruments? It has been argued that “the need to link 
domestic law to universally accepted human rights principles is made neces-
sary by the fact that throughout history, even civil servants and politicians in 
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dictatorial governmental regimes have justified their impunity by claiming 
that their behaviors actually adhered to the rule of law.”98 Consider what for-
mer U.S. President Richard Nixon said during an interview with Sir David 
Frost in 1977. He declared as follows: “Well, when the president does it, that 
means it is not illegal.”99 
Scholars also argue that “if a legal system fails to meet the standards of the 
formal version of the rule of law, it fails to meet the standards of the substan-
tive version also.”100 It is important to note, however, that even if the national 
laws of a country dutifully “incorporate provisions that address human rights 
issues and hence, make national laws reflect universally accepted human 
rights principles, there is no guarantee that such rights would be protected, 
especially if those who serve in government (civil servants and politicians) do 
not respect and obey the law.”101 In fact, if the country does not have a gov-
erning process that adequately constrains or guards the government, civil serv-
ants and political elites are likely to act with impunity even if the constitution 
incorporates provisions of international human rights instruments.102 This im-
plicates Professor Best’s argument that fundamental rights are not secured by 
parchment barriers alone but by “a competent and balanced governing pro-
cess.”103 
The United Nations has also provided a definition for the rule of law: 
[A] principle of governance in which all persons, institutions 
and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are 
accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally en-
forced and independently adjudicated, and which are con-
sistent with international human rights norms and standards. It 
requires measures to ensure adherence to the principles of su-
premacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the 
law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of pow-
ers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoid-
ance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.104 
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Professor John Mitchell Finnis, an international expert on jurisprudence 
and legal philosophy, has argued that the rule of law is “[t]he name commonly 
given to the state of affairs in which a legal system is legally in good shape.”105 
He argues further: 
A legal system exemplifies the Rule of Law to the extent . . . 
that (i) its rules are prospective, not retroactive, and (ii) are not 
in any other way impossible to comply with; that (iii) its rules 
are promulgated, (iv) clear, and (v) coherent one with another; 
that (vi) its rules are sufficiently stable to allow people to be 
guided by their knowledge of the content of the rules; that (vii) 
the making of decrees and orders applicable to relatively lim-
ited situations is guided by rules that are promulgated, clear, 
stable, and relatively general; and that (viii) those people who 
have authority to make, administer, and apply the rules in an 
official capacity (a) are accountable for their compliance with 
rules applicable to their performance and (b) do actually ad-
minister the law consistently and in accordance with its 
tenor.106 
The English-born American political activist and 18th century revolution-
ary, Thomas Paine, argued during the revolution that gave birth to the Amer-
ican Republic that “in America THE LAW IS KING. For as in absolute gov-
ernments the King is law, so in free countries the law ought to be King; and 
there ought to be no other.”107 In 1690, John Locke, the English philosopher 
and physician who is considered the father of Liberalism, argued:  
Where-ever law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be trans-
gressed to another’s harm; and whosoever in authority exceeds 
the power given him by the law, and makes use of the force he 
has under his command, to compass that upon the subject 
which the law allows not, ceases in that to be a magistrate, and, 
acting without authority may be opposed, as any other man, 
who by force invades the right of another.108 
The Founders of the American Republic adopted Locke’s idea of the right 
of the people to remove public officials who abuse the power granted to them 
by the law and extended it to include “revolution,” which they defined as the 
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“right of the people to dissolve the government and replace it with an entirely 
new one.”109 
Although many countries in Africa now boast of governing processes with 
separation of powers, with checks and balances, the rule of law remains elu-
sive and is threatened on a daily basis by various actions undertaken by both 
state and non-state actors. Among these activities are violent and destructive 
mobilization by subcultures that consider themselves marginalized by govern-
ment policies; impunity by state custodians (i.e., civil servants and political 
elites); and the activities of extremist groups, such as Boko Haram in West 
Africa110 and Al Shabaab in East Africa.111 Before we examine threats to the 
rule of law in Africa, it is necessary that we briefly elaborate the rule of law’s 
most important and universally accepted elements. 
 
B. The Elements of the Rule of Law 
 
In order to fully examine the major threats to the rule of law in the African 
countries, it is important to take a closer look at the elements of the rule of 
law. A very important aspect of the rule of law is that “the government must 
obey the law in its actions.”112 This view of the rule of law is shared by former 
U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice, Anthony M. Kennedy, who stated that 
“[t]he Law rests upon known, general principles applicable on equal terms to 
all persons. It follows that the Law is superior to, and thus binds, the govern-
ment and all of its officials.”113 Thus, the law must be supreme and the su-
premacy of law is, for the purposes of this article, the first element of the rule 
of law. 
As argued by the American Bar Association (A.B.A.), “[i]t is very difficult 
for a nation to maintain the rule of law if its citizens do not [accept and] respect 
the law.”114 The A.B.A. then makes this very revealing statement: “Assume 
that people in your community decided that they didn’t want to be bothered 
by traffic laws and began to ignore stop signs and traffic signals. The ability 
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of police officers to enforce the laws would be overwhelmed and the streets 
of your community would quickly become a chaotic and dangerous place.”115 
But, why do people voluntarily obey the law? The A.B.A. argues that “[t]he 
rule of law functions because most of us agree that it is important to observe 
the law, even if a police officer is not present to enforce it.”116 
If the majority of citizens in a country refuse to voluntarily accept and obey 
the law, it would likely be very difficult for government agencies, such as the 
police, whose job it is to enforce the laws and maintain order, to perform their 
jobs. In fact, in such countries, maintaining law and order “would be ex-
tremely costly and the government would likely be forced to devote a signifi-
cant portion of national income to compliance activities, a process that can 
reduce expenditures on important sectors of the economy such as health care 
and human capital development.”117 The second element of the rule of law is 
that the majority of citizens in a country must voluntarily accept, respect, and 
obey the law.118 
In its many decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court has contributed signifi-
cantly to the development of the rule-of-law jurisprudence. For example, in 
U.S. v. United Mine Workers,119 Justice Frankfurter concurred in the Court’s 
judgment, writing: 
In our country law is not a body of technicalities in the keeping 
of specialists or in the service of any special interest. There can 
be no free society without law administered through an inde-
pendent judiciary. If one man can be allowed to determine for 
himself what is law, every man can. That means first chaos, 
then tyranny.120 
Many of the definitions of the rule of law found in the legal literature share 
the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. United Mine Workers that 
“[t]here can be no free society without law administered through an independ-
ent judiciary.”121 As argued by Professor Chemerinsky, an expert on constitu-
tions and constitutionalism, “[a]n independent judiciary is essential to the rule 
of law.”122 The United Nations also acknowledged the importance of an inde-
pendent judiciary to the rule of law when it stated that “the rule of law is a 
principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public 
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 116 Id. 
 117 Mbaku, supra note 60, at 988. 
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restraining order to prevent a strike was proper). 
 120 Id. at 312. 
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or private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly 
promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated.”123 The third 
element of the rule of law, then, is judicial independence. 
In any country, the law cannot function effectively unless citizens “are 
aware of, understand, and appreciate the law.”124 For countries in Africa, 
“[r]obust and broad-based educational programs, including especially those 
targeting heretofore marginalized and deprived groups,125 can help citizens, 
not only understand the laws, but also appreciate them and the role that they 
play in their daily lives.”126 
It is important, however, to understand that these educational programs 
must only supplement but not replace the full and effective participation of 
each country’s relevant stakeholders in the constitution- and law-making pro-
cesses.127 This includes: (1) developing and adopting the constitutional prin-
ciples that would undergird, inform, and constrain the designers of the consti-
tution; (2) selecting individuals to serve on the Constituent Assembly (that is, 
the group that is empowered to draft the constitution); (3) providing necessary 
input to the Constituent Assembly; (4) participating in the ratification of the 
constitution; and (5) taking an active role in law-making in the post-constitu-
tional period.128 The entire constitution-making process, as well as the enact-
ment of laws in the post-constitutional period, must be open, transparent and 
participatory.129 Finally, “[t]he application of laws must be predictable and 
uniform and must not be capricious or arbitrary.”130 Hence, the fourth and fifth 
elements of the rule of law are openness and transparency, and predictability 
of the law respectively. 
Many legal scholars have argued that the rule of law developed “around 
the belief that a primary purpose of the rule of law is the protection of certain 
 
 123 UNITED NATIONS, supra note 104 (emphasis added). 
 124 Mbaku, supra note 60, at 990. 
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basic rights.”131 Many of the people who fought against colonialism and in 
favor of independence in the African colonies “believed that independence 
would provide them with the opportunity to rid themselves of the dysfunc-
tional European institutions and replace them with institutional arrangements 
designed exclusively by Africans and which would be undergirded by the rule 
of law.”132 The hope of those Africans who participated in the decolonization 
project was that the departure of the Europeans would allow them to dismantle 
colonial institutions and develop and adopt governing processes capable of 
adequately constraining the state, minimizing impunity, and guaranteeing the 
recognition and protection of human rights.133 Hence, the sixth element of the 
rule of law is the recognition and protection of human rights. 
III.  THE RULE OF LAW AND LEGITIMACY OF AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS 
The rule of law is the cornerstone of any legitimate democratic State. In 
general, the rule of law requires that the state “subject the citizenry” and itself 
“to publicly promulgated laws.”134 In addition, “the state’s legislative function 
[must] be separate from the adjudicative function” and “no one within the 
polity [must] be above the law.”135 Adherence or fidelity to the rule of law is 
one of the “three essential characteristics of modern constitutionalism.”136 The 
others are protection of human rights and the guarding or constraining of the 
exercise of government power.137 
The rule of law is so important to constitutional democracy that, without 
it, it would be impossible to have constitutional government. One cannot con-
sider a contemporary African state as legitimate, particularly from the point 
of view of the majority of its citizens, if it is lacking any or all of the three 
characteristics of the modern constitutional State. In today’s African coun-
tries, the absence or lack of these three elements or characteristics has not only 
greatly diminished prospects for the practice of constitutionalism but has also 
delegitimized the State—at least, in the eyes of some of the country’s subcul-
tures—and has significantly increased the distrust that many subcultures have 
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for their governments.138 This is particularly true among groups that have his-
torically been exploited and “marginalized and pushed to the economic and 
political periphery.”139 
But, why should Africans bother themselves about constitutionalism and 
how the latter is related to the rule of law? First, the practice of constitution-
alism will ensure that, in each country, the constitution will not eventually 
become just “another instrument of rule” that is likely to be “discarded alto-
gether.”140 Second, constitutional government can and “must provide a solid 
basis for the respect of the rule of law, democracy, and good governance.”141 
Nevertheless, constitutionalism has been distinguished from democracy and 
the rule of law.142 As argued by constitutional scholar, Professor Charles 
Manga Fombad, while “many of the core elements of constitutionalism . . . 
are also necessary for the rule of law to exist, . . . the latter concept [i.e., the 
rule of law] is slightly narrower in scope.”143 Although “[r]espect for the rule 
of law on its own may not necessarily lead to the existence of constitutional-
ism,” however, “constitutionalism is safeguarded by the rule of law and with-
out the rule of law there can be no constitutionalism.”144 
It has been argued that “constitutional democracy under the rule of law” 
may not always be desirable or “the best alternative”145 and that, in some sit-
uations, it might be “superfluous and undesirable.”146 Rosenfeld argues, for 
example, that “in a close knit homogeneous society that is deeply religious 
and ruled by revered leaders who are widely believed to have direct access to 
divine commands, a theocracy would plainly seem more appropriate than a 
constitutional democracy”147 and that “instructions and directions imparted by 
the religious leaders would be paramount, leaving little, if any, room for the 
rule of law.”148 
Nevertheless, in divided or heterogeneous societies, which are likely to 
face “various competing conceptions of the good, constitutional democracy 
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and adherence to the rule of law may well be indispensable to achieving po-
litical cohesion with minimum oppression.”149 African countries are divided 
societies—they comprise of different subcultures or ethnocultural groups that 
usually do not share the same culture, customs, traditions, and values. It is 
possible that these different groups do not share the “same conceptions of the 
good.”150 It is also argued that even if a society is homogenous, it can still be 
“pluralistic-in-fact” if “every person is viewed as entitled to pursue his or her 
own individual good.”151 
Where society is “pluralistic-in-fact,” that is, groups or individuals within 
the society do not have or share the same values, the question of the legitimacy 
of the state and its “fundamental political institutions” will “ultimately de-
pend[] on some kind of consent among all those who are subjected to such 
institutions.”152 This tradition ties the legitimacy of the state and governing 
institutions to the consent of the governed (i.e., the sovereign) and can be 
traced to the ideas of the Founders of the American Republic, such as James 
Madison, as well as those of Thomas Hobbes153 and John Locke.154 
When designing of the U.S. Constitution, the drafters argued that a gov-
ernment had to “stand on the original and ongoing consent of the gov-
erned.”155 The founders of the American Republic adopted John Locke’s idea 
of “ongoing consent” and greatly extended it to include “the right of the peo-
ple to dissolve the government and replace it with an entirely new one,”156 
even if that had to be undertaken or achieved through revolution. James Mad-
ison, considered the Father of the American Constitution, defined the “repub-
lican” form of government in Federalist No. 39 as: 
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[A] government which derives all its powers directly or indi-
rectly from the great body of the people; and is administered 
by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited 
period, or during good behavior. It is essential to such a gov-
ernment, that it be derived from the great body of the society, 
not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of 
it.157 
There are a lot of reasons why some groups within African countries con-
sider their governments illegitimate. These include, but are not limited to, the 
fact that many incumbent governments (1) did not come into being with the 
consent of these groups; (2) do not seek these groups’ ongoing consent to 
govern; (3) do not protect the rights of all groups; (4) promote values that are 
totally different from, and in many cases antithetical, to those that many 
groups hold dear; and (5) engage in behaviors (e.g., corruption) that margin-
alize some subcultures and force them to live perpetually in extreme poverty 
on the economic margins. Among African governments that are seen as ille-
gitimate by some subcultures within their individual countries, the Republic 
of Cameroon is a very good example. In today’s Republic of Cameroon, many 
Anglophones do not see the Francophone-dominated central government as 
legitimate. This is due primarily to (1) the atrocities committed against the 
Anglophones by the central government; (2) the failure of the central govern-
ment to include Anglophones in the design and implementation of public pol-
icy; (3) concerted efforts by the central government to destroy Anglophone 
institutions (e.g., the replacement of the Common Law by French Civil law in 
Anglophone courts); and (4) the failure of the central government to promote 
economic growth and development in the Anglophone Regions.158 
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What is now the Republic of Cameroon came into being in 1961 through 
a merger of the UN Trust Territory of Southern Cameroons under British ad-
ministration with the République du Cameroun.159 While Cameroon “is made 
up of over 250 ethnic groups, which form five major regional-cultural group-
ings,” the most politically divisive and challenging division of the population 
is that which is based on colonial heritage.160 When unification took place in 
1961 between the U.N. Trust Territory of Southern Cameroons under British 
administration and the République du Cameroun, the new country that was 
created brought together what came to be known as the Anglo-Saxon161 and 
Gaullist162 traditions. In the new union, Southern Cameroonians came to be 
known as “Anglophones” and citizens of the République du Cameroun were 
called “Francophones.”163 
Since 1961, Anglophones have complained that they have been systemat-
ically marginalized, both politically and economically, by the Francophone-
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dominated central government. In addition to the fact that virtually all of the 
top-level civil servants and political elites that have governed Cameroon have 
been Francophones, no Anglophone has ever served as President of the Re-
public of Cameroon. All Anglophones who have served in the president’s cab-
inet have usually been given positions with no real decision-making authority. 
In fact, in 2017, fifty-six years after unification, “there was only one Anglo-
phone among 36 ministers with portfolio.”164 
It is estimated that about seventy percent of the natural resources that are 
exported from Cameroon are extracted out of the Anglophone Regions of the 
country.165 Yet, the two Anglophone Regions receive less than ten percent of 
the revenues accruing to the government from such exploitation. In addition, 
infrastructure in the Anglophone Regions, including especially the road sys-
tem, remains essentially either underdeveloped or nonexistent.166 
Many Anglophones have complained that their political and economic 
marginalization is due to the fact that since unification in 1961, the central 
government has governed the country without their consent.167 That failure to 
consult, the Anglophones argue, has resulted in the design and implementa-
tion of public policies that have underdeveloped the Anglophone Regions of 
the country and forced the people to live in abject poverty while the Franco-
phone Regions continue to enjoy relatively robust rates of development.168 
In late-2016, Anglophone lawyers and teachers organized and carried out 
a peaceful protest against efforts by the Francophone-dominated central gov-
ernment to impose French institutions on the Anglophone Regions.169 Specif-
ically, Anglophone lawyers were complaining about the central government’s 
decision to impose French civil law on courts in the Anglophone Regions and 
to require that the adjudication of court cases should be undertaken only in 
French.170 Anglophone teachers joined the strike and demonstrations in re-
sponse to the central government’s decision to impose the French language on 
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schools in the Anglophone Regions, as well as send French-speaking teachers 
to teach subjects other than French language and literature in Anglophone 
schools.171 In addition to requesting that both the French Civil law system and 
the French language not be imposed on Anglophone courts, the striking law-
yers also wanted the central government to remove all French-speaking 
judges, specifically those who cannot communicate and write well in English, 
from Anglophone courts, as well as make certain that all national laws, in-
cluding treaties and international conventions to which Cameroon is a State 
Party, are also provided in English.172 
Although the Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon guarantees the 
equality of English and French, the latter dominates in political discourse, in-
cluding especially the communications of the central government, and that 
includes not just decrees issued by the President of the Republic, but also leg-
islative enactments, treaties, and conventions signed or entered into by the 
country.173 This situation is especially troublesome for many Anglophone 
lawyers who must secure, at their own expense, translations of treaties signed 
and ratified by the country, since the documents are all in French. These un-
official translations, of course, are not accepted as legal documents before the 
country’s courts and tribunals.174 
The demonstrations against actual and perceived marginalization of the 
Anglophones by the Francophone-dominated central government started in 
late-2016.175 Rather than engage in dialogue with the protesters, the central 
government responded with brute force and extreme violence.176 In fact, se-
curity forces sent to the Anglophone Regions by the central government used 
“live bullets and tear gas to disperse” the protesting Anglophones and in the 
process, several people were killed.177 In view of the government’s violent 
response to the peaceful protests, as well as President Paul Biya’s unwilling-
ness to engage in dialogue with the aggrieved Anglophones, more radical 
groups within the Anglophone Regions declared their intention to secede and 
 
 171 Id.; see also Teachers in English-Speaking Areas of Cameroon Remain on Strike, 
VOA (Oct. 7, 2017), https://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/4059569.html (noting that the 
Cameroon Anglophone Teacher’s Union, which joined striking lawyers, was concerned 
about the government’s practice of sending French-speaking teachers to the Anglophone 
Regions to teach “in areas outside of their training”). 
 172 John Russell, Lawyers in Cameroon Are Fighting the Justice System, VOA NEWS 
(Nov. 17, 2016), https://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/lawyers-in-cameroon-are-fighting 
-the-justice-system/3600857.html. 
 173 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON, Jan. 18, 1996, arts. 1–3. 
 174 Id. (stating that most official documents are written only in French). 
 175 Conor Gaffey, Understanding Cameroon’s Anglophone Protests, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 
13, 2017), http://www.newsweek.com/cameroon-anglophone-problem-paul-biya-556151. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
2020] THREATS TO THE RULE OF LAW IN AFRICA 323 
form the independent Republic of Ambazonia.178 That decision significantly 
escalated what had already deteriorated into a bloody and extremely violent 
conflict—in fact, by the spring of 2018, the international press was reporting 
that more than 2,000 people had been killed in the Anglophone Regions and 
as many as 170 villages burned.179 Some members of the international com-
munity were calling the activities of the central government in the Anglo-
phone Regions a genocide against the Anglophone peoples.180 
Cameroon, of course, is not the only country in which the failure of the 
government to adhere to the rule of law or practice constitutionalism has 
forced some population groups within the country to consider the government 
illegitimate. Other examples include Mali,181 South Sudan,182 and the Central 
African Republic.183 
 
 178 The declaration creating a new country called the Republic of Ambazonia was made 
on October 1, 2017. See, e.g., Abu-Bakarr Jalloh, Cameroon in Angst Over ‘Ambazonia 
Independence Anniversary’, DW (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.dw.com/en/cameroon-in-ang 
st-over-ambazonia-independence-anniversary/a-45712977. 
 179 Samuel Smith, Cameroon: Over 2,000 Killed, 170 Villages Burned as Military Takes 
Control of Churches, CHRISTIAN EXAMINER (Aug. 11, 2018), https://www.christianexamin 
er.com/article/cameroon-over-2000-killed-170-villages-burned-as-military-takes-control- 
of-churches/51812.htm. 
 180 See Peter Zongo, ‘This Is a Genocide’: Villages Burn as War Rages in Blood-Soaked 
Cameroon, THE GUARDIAN (May 30, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/global-develop 
ment/2018/may/30/cameroon-killings-escalate-anglophone-crisis (noting, inter alia, that 
the international community is now referring to the Anglophone crisis as a genocide com-
mitted by the central government on Anglophone citizens). 
 181 In Mali, the Tuareg, who have fought the central government since 1963, have re-
mained unwilling to recognize the legitimacy of any of the regimes that have ruled the 
country from Bamako, the capital city. See, e.g., Ra’pheal Davis, Addressing Conflict in 
Mali: Political, Humanitarian, and Security Problems, SIGMA IOTA RHO J. OF INT’L REL. 
(Oct. 1, 2018), http://www.sirjournal.org/research/2018/10/1/addressing-conflict-in-mali- 
political-humanitarian-and-security-problems; see also YUSUF IBRAHIM GAMAWA, THE 
TUAREGS AND THE 2012 REBELLION IN MALI 35–37 (2017) (examining the continuing strug-
gle between the central government and various militias for control of the northern parts of 
Mali). 
 182 Since December 2013, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition 
(SPLM-IO), led by former Vice President, Riek Machar and populated mainly by members 
of the Nuer subculture, have fought the government of President Salva Kiir and the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). The SPLM is led by Kiir and is dominated by 
Kirr’s Dinka subculture. The SPLM-IO does not see the SPLM and Kiir as the country’s 
legitimate governors. The civil war has killed more than 400,000 people and displaced 
more than four million others. See Winsor, supra note 16. 
 183 The Central African Republic’s present civil war started after Séléka rejected the le-
gitimacy of President François Bozize and overthrew him in early 2013. Bozize’s support 
came primarily from the Christian anti-Balaka militias. The war has involved primarily 
struggles between rebels from the Séléka coalition and anti-Balaka militias. The Séléka are 
made up primarily of Muslim groups while the anti-Balaka consists primarily of Christian 
militias. Although the various armed groups reached a peace deal early in 2019, the vio-
lence has not fully abated. See Central African Republic Armed Groups Reach Peace Deal, 
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In pluralistic societies, consent is not only important and critical to the le-
gitimacy of the government, but it also provides a foundation for constitu-
tional democracy and the rule of law. It is important to note, however, that 
constitutional democracies usually implement “the will of political majori-
ties” and as a consequence, can force “political minorities to contribute to the 
realization of majority objectives with which minorities may strongly disa-
gree.”184 The Founders of the American Republic faced this problem and 
sought ways to place significant checks or constraints on the power of the 
majority in order to minimize what they referred to as majority (majoritarian) 
tyranny or tyranny of majority faction.185 In doing so, Madison and his con-
temporaries argued that minimizing tyranny by majority faction required 
much more than using the constitution to place constraints on the government 
or guard the latter. These constitutional constraints, which Madison referred 
to as “parchment barriers,” were a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
the effective and full protection of fundamental rights and the minimization 
of majority tyranny. A constitution, it is argued, is just “a piece of paper, and 
‘parchment barriers’ are never much use against lead and steel and chains and 
guns.”186 Madison argued, in correspondence with Thomas Jefferson, that 
“experience proves the inefficacy of a bill of rights on those occasions when 
its control is most needed. Repeated violations of these parchment barriers 
have been committed by overbearing majorities in every State.”187 In Feder-
alist No. 51, Madison argued that given the fact that an oppressive majority 
“cannot be restrained,” it is necessary, then, to make certain that an oppressive 
majority does not form.188 He then proceeded to present arguments for “extent 
of territory” and “multiplicity of interests, which he argued were the “cure” 
for this major threat to “majority-rule regimes.”189 He then stated that: 
It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the 
society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one 
 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/02/world/africa/central-af-
rican-republic-peace-deal.html. In 2015, Noureddine Adam, head of one of the factions of 
Séléka, proclaimed an autonomous state in the northeastern part of the country. See Crispin 
Dembassa-Kette, Rebel Declares Autonomous State in Central African Republic, REUTERS 
(Dec. 15, 2015), https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-centralafrica-politics/rebel-declares-au-
tonomous-state-in-central-african-republic-idUKKBN0TY1FO20151215. 
 184 Rosenfeld, supra note 134, at 1312. 
 185 THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, 276–77 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999). 
 186 See Benjamin R. Barber, Constitutional Rights—Democratic Instrument or Demo-
cratic Obstacle?, in THE FRAMERS AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 23, 30 (Robert A. Licht ed., 
1991). 
 187 ROBERT A. GOLDWIN, FROM PARCHMENT TO POWER: HOW JAMES MADISON USED THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS TO SAVE THE CONSTITUTION 97 (1997) (quoting Madison to Jefferson (Oct. 
17, 1788)). 
 188 Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999)). 
 189 Id. 
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part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Dif-
ferent interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. 
If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the 
minority will be insecure.190 
The Constitution, Madison argued, was crafted to minimize or prevent the 
formation of oppressive majorities “by comprehending in the society so many 
separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a ma-
jority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable.”191 Madison went 
on to argue that: 
There are but two methods of providing against this evil:192 the 
one by creating a will in the community independent of the 
majority—that is, of society itself; . . . . [This] method prevails 
in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed 
authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a 
power independent of the society may as well espouse the un-
just views of the major as the rightful interests of the minor 
party, and may possibly be turned against both parties.193 
Madison’s argument was that without effective and robust supporting po-
litical institutions, the rights contained in the Constitution (e.g., a Bill of 
Rights) would be nothing but parchment barriers to majoritarian tyranny.194 
Hence, rights are secured, not just by parchment barriers alone, but also by 
the existence of what Best refers to as “a competent and balanced governing 
process.”195 
But, is there a relationship between constitutional democracy, the rule of 
law, and the legitimacy of government? First, if a constitutional democracy is 
used only to implement the will of the majority or push through policies that 
benefit exclusively or even primarily the majority and marginalize the minor-
ity, it is likely the case that the minority will consider the government illegit-
imate. The minority, as has been illustrated by several situations in the African 
countries,196 may opt for violent and destructive mobilization in an effort 
 
 190 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 188, at 291. 
 191 Id. at 292. 
 192 That is, majoritarian tyranny. 
 193 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 188,  at 291–92. 
 194 Best, supra note 103. Such a governing process is undergirded by the separation of 
powers with effective checks and balances—an independent judiciary; a bicameral legis-
lature, with each chamber allowed to exercise an absolute veto over legislation passed by 
the other; and an independent and competent executive. 
 195 Id. 
 196 This situation is aptly illustrated by the decision of a group of subcultures in Eastern 
Nigeria, led by Col. Emeka Ojukwu, to secede and found their own state called the 
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either to capture the government or secede and form their own State.197 In 
other words, if, as feared by Madison and other Founders of the American 
Republic, constitutional democracy becomes a tool used to inflict tyranny on 
the minority by majority faction, regardless of how it is constituted,198 the 
minority can resort to revolution, as happened in Nigeria (1967–1970) and is 
currently taking place in Cameroon (2019).199 
The founders of the American Republic recognized the problem of tyranny 
by majority faction and borrowed Locke’s idea of the right of the governed 
(i.e., the people) to remove from office officials—whether civil servants or 
politicians—who had abused the power granted them by the people through 
the constitution.200 They then extended Locke’s idea to include revolution, 
which the founders of the American Republic defined as the “right of the peo-
ple to dissolve the government and to replace it with an entirely new one.”201 
Thus, to ensure the state does not lose its legitimacy in the eyes of the various 
groups that exist within the country, it is necessary to guard against tyranny 
by majority faction and make certain that the apparatus of government is not 
used to suppress or exploit some groups within the country. 
 
Republic of Biafra. For example, in a State of the Nation speech to the people of the seces-
sionist Republic of Biafra, its leader, Col. Ojukwu, justified the decision to secede from 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria by stating that “Nigeria persecuted and slaughtered her 
minorities; Nigerian justice was a farce; her elections, her census, her politics—her every-
thing—was corrupt.” Emeka Ojukwu, The Ahiara Declaration: The Principles of the Bia-
fran Revolution, BIAFRA NATION http://www.biafraland.com/ahiara_declaration_1969.htm 
l (last visited Oct. 29, 2019). 
 197 See generally AL J. VENTER, BIAFRA’S WAR, 1967–1970: A TRIBAL CONFLICT IN 
NIGERIA THAT LEFT A MILLION DEAD (2015) (summarizing the efforts of supporters of Bi-
afra to destabilize Nigeria). 
 198 Most majority factions in the African countries are coalitions of subcultures. An ex-
ample is the ruling coalition in Kenya, which is made up primarily of the Kikuyu and 
Kalenjin subcultures. President Uhuru Kenyatta is a Kikuyu (Gikuyu) and his Deputy Pres-
ident, William Ruto, is a Kalenjin. See, e.g., Uhuru Kenyatta: Kenya’s ‘Digital President’, 
BBC NEWS (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21544245 (noting 
that Kenyatta receives most of his support primarily from the Kikuyu subculture and Ruto’s 
from the Kalenjin subculture). 
 199 Between 1967 and 1970, several minority ethnic groups in Nigeria, reacting to what 
they argued was oppression by the majority faction, opted to secede to form their own state. 
Ojukwu, supra note 196. Although the effort, which resulted in a brutal civil war, was 
unsuccessful, it nevertheless revealed several forms of dysfunction within the Nigerian po-
litical system. See, e.g., PETER BAXTER, BIAFRA: THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR, 1967–1970 
(2015) (examining the civil war that followed the decision by several minority ethnic 
groups in the Eastern Region of Nigeria to secede and found the Republic of Biafra). In 
October 2016, lawyers and teachers in the Anglophone Regions of Cameroon engaged in 
peaceful demonstrations against what they argued was their marginalization by the Fran-
cophone-dominated central government. The government responded with brute force, lead-
ing to what the international community has described as genocide against the Anglo-
phones. See, e.g., Zongo, supra note 180. 
 200 See Best, supra note 103, at 39. 
 201 Id. 
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Second, the rule of law only functions if (1) the law is supreme; (2) a ma-
jority of citizens voluntarily accept and respect the law; (3) the judiciary is 
independent; (4) there is openness and transparency in government commu-
nication; (5) the law is predictable; and (6) there is a recognition and protec-
tion of human rights.202 Take the supremacy of law, for example. In a country 
where there is fidelity to the rule of law, it is the case that “[t]he law is superior 
to all members of society, including government officials vested with either 
executive, legislative, or judicial power.”203 As argued by Dicey, fidelity to 
the rule of law implies that: 
[N]o man is above the law, but that every man, whatever his 
rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm, 
and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals . . . . 
With us, every official, from the Prime Minister down to a con-
stable or collector of taxes, is under the same responsibility for 
every act done without legal justification as any other citi-
zen.204 
Unfortunately, in many African countries, certain high-ranking civil serv-
ants and political elites consider themselves above the law and act with impu-
nity. These high-ranking officials are called “untouchables” in many African 
countries and are rarely, if ever, prosecuted for their crimes, which include 
corrupt enrichment, as well as various atrocities committed against their fel-
low citizens.205 In fact, in 2008, the President of the Republic of Cameroon, 
Paul Biya, had the constitution amended to place himself above the law.206 
Specifically, the constitution was amended to grant Biya blanket immunity 
from all crimes committed while in office.207 According to Article 53(3) of 
the Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon, “[a]cts committed by the Pres-
ident of the Republic . . . shall be covered by immunity and he shall not be 
accountable for them after the exercise of his functions.”208 
If high-ranking officials, including especially the president, consider them-
selves above the law and act accordingly, marginalized and oppressed 
 
 202 Stein, supra note 88, at 301–02. 
 203 Id. at 302. 
 204 JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE 
UNITED STATES 34 (1959). 
 205 See, e.g., JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, CORRUPTION IN AFRICA: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, 
AND CLEANUPS 96–97 (2010) (noting the failure or unwillingness of the government in 
Cameroon to prosecute certain high-ranking civil servants and political elites who act 
above the law). 
 206 Constitution Amended to Open Door for Biya’s Third Term, RADIO FR. INT’L (Nov. 4, 
2008), http://www1.rfi.fr/actuen/articles/100/article_53.asp. 
 207 Id. 
 208 CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON (1972) art. 53(3). 
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individuals and groups are likely to lose their trust in the government. Some 
groups may actually consider the government illegitimate and seek ways, in-
cluding the use of violence, to either oust that government or secede and form 
their own state. 
Effectively resolving this political quagmire requires, at the minimum, that 
the country put in place the following: (1) provide, through a democratic, bot-
tom-up, people-driven, participatory and inclusive constitution-making pro-
cess, a constitution that creates a governing process undergirded by separation 
of powers, with checks and balances. Those checks and balances should in-
clude an independent judiciary; (2) a guarantee of freedom of the press—so-
cial scientists have determined that a country in which civil society possesses 
“free speech, a free press, and freedom of opposition has a greater potential 
for influencing the decisions of the elites than does a country where these lib-
erties do not exist”;209 (3) a bicameral legislature, with each chamber allowed 
to exercise an absolute veto over legislation passed by the other; and (4) an 
independent and competent executive. 
In countries where (i) civil servants and political elites consider themselves 
above the law and act with impunity; (ii) there is a lack of openness and trans-
parency in government communication, making it very difficult for the people 
to have access to the information that they need to check on the government; 
(iii) there is a lack of predictability in the law, making it extremely difficult 
for citizens to understand what the law is; (iv) the judiciary is not independent 
but is subservient to the executive and, in addition, is subject to political ma-
nipulation; (v) there is an imperial or reinforced presidency, with the president 
engaging routinely in various forms of abuse of power; and (vi) there exists a 
subservient and extremely weak legislature, and governance is unlikely to be 
characterized by the practice of constitutional democracy and adherence to the 
rule of law. 
Public policy-making in these countries is likely to be dominated by the 
ruling majority faction, with virtually no participation by minority groups. As 
a consequence, the outcome of the policy-making process would usually be 
policies that do not reflect the interests and values of the country’s various 
minorities. Within such an institutional environment, there is likely to be a 
rise in government impunity and a marked deterioration in the protection of 
fundamental rights, including especially those of vulnerable groups, such as 
women, infants and children, and ethnic and religious minorities. Tyranny by 
majority faction will eventually become a pervasive part of public policy. The 
resulting economic and political marginalization of these minority groups and 
their subsequent relegation to the margins, can force some of them to resort to 
violent mobilization, creating conditions that can deteriorate into prolonged 
civil strife and perhaps, war. Hence, it is important that each country provide 
 
 209 See Kenneth A. Bollen, Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Political Democ-
racy, 45 AM. SOC. REV. 370, 372 (1980). 
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itself with institutional arrangements undergirded by the rule of law and the 
practice of constitutional democracy. In the absence of such institutional ar-
rangements, the government is unlikely to be considered legitimate, especially 
by groups that have been driven to the political and economic margins by the 
ruling majority faction. 
IV. THREATS TO THE RULE OF LAW IN AFRICA 
A. Introduction 
 
Although African countries currently suffer from a plethora of economic, 
political and social problems, the most important of them include how to (1) 
effectively manage diversity and significantly enhance peaceful coexistence; 
(2) create an institutional environment that encourages and enhances entre-
preneurship and the creation of wealth that can be used to deal with extreme 
poverty and provide for human development; (3) eradicate, or at the very least, 
minimize corruption and other behaviors that stunt entrepreneurship and eco-
nomic growth; (4) recognize and protect human rights, including especially 
those of vulnerable groups, such as women, children, and religious and ethnic 
minorities; (5) emphasize public policies that are pro-poor and enhance the 
ability of people living in extreme poverty to develop the skills and compe-
tencies that they need to participate more productively and gainfully in eco-
nomic growth; (6) prevent government impunity, particularly the abuse of 
power by the president and other high-ranking officials and political elites; 
and (7) minimize opportunities for the capture of the state by private business 
interests.210 These issues are directly linked to the failure of African countries 
to have effective and fully-functioning constitutional governance and rule-of-
law regimes. In the sections that follow, this article examines the most im-
portant threats to the rule of law in the African countries. 
 
B. Government Impunity as a Major Threat to the Rule of Law in Africa 
 
One of the most important threats to the rule of law in the African countries 
is government impunity, particularly the abuse of power by the president and 
other high-ranking public servants and politicians. In each African country, 
“[i]mpunity usually arises from the failure by relevant public authorities, ei-
ther through lack of capacity or political will, to bring perpetrators of crimes 
 
 210 See generally MBAKU, supra note 61, at 41–45, 91–112 (examining the pervasiveness 
of certain political and economic problems in the African countries); see also John Mukum 
Mbaku, Rule of Law, State Capture, and Human Development in Africa, 33 AM. U. INT’L 
L. REV. 771 (2018) (examining state capture in Africa and its impact on human develop-
ment, with emphasis on the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of South 
Africa). 
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to account for those crimes.”211 Specifically, impunity can occur in a country 
when the government deliberately or through neglect, exempts “from prose-
cution and punishment,” individuals, whether state- or non-state actors, who 
engage in criminal activities or behaviors.212 Impunity can also arise from the 
case where an individual who is convicted and fined by a recognized tribunal 
is allowed by the government to escape the payment of the fines.213 
In international law, impunity often involves the failure of governments to 
bring to justice individuals who violate human rights or commit atrocities that 
threaten international peace and security, and the failure of governments to 
redress the wrongs done to victims. In countries, such as Somalia, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, South Sudan, and the Republic of Sudan,214 where the 
perpetrators of human rights violations are likely to be members of the incum-
bent government or their agents, it is often the case that those who commit the 
various atrocities are not likely to be brought to justice.215 In these countries, 
the government either no longer has control over most of the national territory 
or, for a variety of reasons, is not willing or able to bring those who have 
committed international crimes to justice.216 
In Africa, impunity is endemic in countries, which have weak217 or dys-
functional218 governing processes. In these countries, civil servants and 
 
 211 Mbaku, Struggle Against Impunity, supra note 5, at 94. 
 212 Id. 
 213 Id. 
 214 For example, consider the Interahamwe in Rwanda and the Janjaweed in the Republic 
of Sudan. In Rwanda, the Interahamwe was an extremist government-backed militia that 
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Spring of 1994. See, e.g., DENISE BENTROVATO, NARRATING AND TEACHING THE NATION: 
THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION IN PRE- AND POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA (2015) (examining the 
role played by the Interahamwe in the Rwanda Genocide). The Janjaweed are a militia 
group in western Sudan that has actively participated, along with the government in Khar-
toum, in the genocide in Darfur. Founded in 1987, its membership consists primarily of 
Sudanese Arab tribes. See generally MODERN GENOCIDE: THE DEFINITIVE RESOURCE AND 
DOCUMENT COLLECTION 641 (Paul R. Bartrop & Steven Leonard Jacobs eds., 2014) (ex-
amining the participation of the Janjaweed in the atrocities committed by the government 
of Sudan in the Darfur Region of the country). Many scholars of genocide studies have 
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struction in the Darfur region of Sudan.” Id. at 693. 
 215 Mbaku, Rule of Law, State Capture, and Human Development in Africa, supra note 
210, at 94. 
 216 Id. 
 217 In a country, such as South Sudan, the government has been severely weakened by 
fighting between subcultures—mainly the ruling Dinka and the opposition Nuer—for con-
trol of the apparatus of government. In fact, in 2013, the fighting deteriorated into a civil 
war that continues to this day. See, e.g., JOHN YOUNG, SOUTH SUDAN’S CIVIL WAR: 
VIOLENCE, INSURGENCY AND FAILED PEACEMAKING (2019) (examining South Sudan’s de-
scent into violent and destructive civil war in December 2013). 
 218 In some countries, such as Cameroon, the main issue is not the lack of capacity by the 
government. Instead, it is the fact that state capacity is being used by the president and 
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political elites are not well-constrained or guarded by the law, and, as a con-
sequence, these individuals are able to act with impunity. For example, in 
Cameroon, government security forces, which have committed and continue 
to commit atrocities in the Anglophone Regions of the country, have been 
protected by the government. None of them has ever been brought to justice 
for the massacre of Anglophones and the burning of their villages. In fact, 
some international observers now refer to the atrocities committed against An-
glophones by Cameroon’s central government as “genocide.”219 In addition, 
the police “routinely arrest and torture individuals suspected of being homo-
sexuals or engaging in same-sex intimacy but are not prosecuted for such hu-
man rights abuses.”220 In recent years, government security forces have been 
using laws against terrorism to arrest, torture, and violate the rights of jour-
nalists and other members of civil society who are working to check the exer-
cise of government power.221 Yet, none of these security officials, who “arrest 
and detain journalists without probable cause” have ever been brought to jus-
tice.222 
The culture of impunity that pervades the government of the Republic of 
Cameroon starts from the top—the country’s president, Paul Biya, can be con-
sidered the leader and chief culprit in “this insidious culture of impunity.”223 
In 2008, Biya had the constitution amended to grant him immunity from 
crimes committed while in office. As made possible by Article 53(3) of the 
amended constitution,224 after he leaves office, Biya cannot be prosecuted for 
 
members of his government to oppress several sectors of the population, primarily the An-
glophones. See, e.g., Denis Foretia, Cameroon Continues Its Oppression of English Speak-
ers, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions 
/wp/2017/03/21/cameroon-continues-its-oppression-of-english-speakers (examining the 
continued oppression of the Anglophones by the Francophone-dominated central govern-
ment in Cameroon); see also Hollie McKay, War of Words: Oppressed English Speakers 
Targeted in Escalating Cameroonian Conflict, FOX NEWS (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.fo 
xnews.com/world/oppressed-english-speakers-in-cameroon-targeted-in-escalating-conflic 
t (noting that since the conflict started, “more than 400 [people] have been killed . . . , and 
a further 437,000 people have been displaced, the vast majority being women and chil-
dren”). 
 219 Zongo, supra note 180. 
 220 Mbaku, Struggle Against Impunity, supra note 5, at 95; see also Guilty by Association: 
Human Rights Violations in the Enforcement of Cameroon’s Anti-Homosexuality Law, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 21, 2013), https://www. hrw.org/report/2013/03/21/guilty-a 
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 221 Mbaku, Struggle Against Impunity supra note 5, at 95 (noting that “Cameroon’s se-
curity forces have been using laws against terrorism to torture and violate the human rights 
of journalists and other citizens”). 
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 223 Id. at 96. 
 224 The official name of the amended constitution is “Loi no 2008–1 du 14 avril 2008 
modifiant et complétant certaines dispositions de la loi no 96 –6 du 18 janvier 1996 portant 
révision de la Constitution du 2 juin 1972.” Law No. 2008–1 of 14 April 2008 to Amend 
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any crimes that he committed while he was in office. The amended constitu-
tion effectively puts him above the law.225 
The constitutional amendment of 2008 granted the President of the Repub-
lic of Cameroon a blanket exemption. It “does not make an exemption in the 
case of serious offenses, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic 
cleansing, and genocide.”226 As a consequence, the country’s legal system will 
not hold Biya accountable for the various atrocities that his troops have com-
mitted (and continue to commit) in the Anglophone Regions of Cameroon.227 
There is no question that the impunity of President Paul Biya and members 
of his government has contributed significantly to the destruction of the rule 
of law in Cameroon. The rule of law cannot function effectively in a country 
if its top leaders do not recognize the supremacy of law but instead place 
themselves above the law. It is not likely that a significant part of the popula-
tion of a country would voluntarily accept and respect the law if their political 
leaders, including especially the president, place themselves above the law 
and act with impunity. And, without voluntary acceptance and respect of, as 
well as fidelity to, the law by a majority of citizens, it would be virtually im-
possible to maintain the rule of law. 
In his discussion of the rule of law, Lord Bingham argued that “all persons 
and authorities within the state, whether public or private, should be bound by 
and entitled to the benefit of laws publicly and prospectively promulgated and 
publicly administered in the courts.”228 When Lord Bingham mentioned “all 
persons,” he did not make any exceptions. In fact, other contributors to the 
legal literature and jurisprudence on the rule of law have stated that in a coun-
try where the rule of law is guaranteed, “[t]he law is superior to all members 
of society, including government officials vested with either executive, legis-
lative, or judicial power.”229 
The A.B.A. has argued that “[t]he rule of law does not depend on a U.S.-
style separation of powers . . . . The key point is that every form of govern-
ment has to have some system to ensure that no one in the government has so 
much power that they can act above the law.”230 Unfortunately, for African 
countries with imperial or reinforced presidencies, such as Cameroon, the 
president has been granted enough power to act above the law. Hence, gov-
ernment impunity, including especially that by the president, is a major threat 
to the rule of law in African countries. 
 
and Supplement some Provisions of Law No. 96–6 of 18 January 1996 to Amend the Con-
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 227 Id. 
 228 BINGHAM, supra note 80, at 5. 
 229 Stein, supra note 88, at 302 (emphasis added). 
 230 See What is the Rule of Law, supra note 114. 
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C. The Military Coup as a Challenge to the Rule of Law 
 
As colonies in Africa gained independence and formed new sovereign 
states, the military coup emerged as one of the most important threats to the 
maintenance of the rule of law, as well as to peace and security in these new 
countries. The first military coup d’état in an independent African country 
took place in Egypt on July 23, 1952 when members of the Free Officers 
Movement overthrew King Farouk.231 Although Nasser was the brains behind 
the coup, General Muhammad Naguib, a co-leader of the coup, was asked to 
take leadership of the movement and post-coup government because Nasser 
feared that he and his fellow soldiers might not be considered serious leaders 
because of their youth.232 However, two years later, Nasser ousted Naguib and 
assumed the presidency of Egypt.233 
The 1952 Egyptian “revolution” placed the military in a position to remain 
an integral part of governance in the country indefinitely. In fact, the country’s 
first four presidents were drawn from the military and the present president, 
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, is a former military officer who came to power through 
a military coup that ousted democratically-elected president, Mohamed 
Morsi.234 
The Egyptian military coup of 1952 appeared to have paved the way for 
the emergence of the coup d’état as a popular method of regime change in 
post-independence Africa. It was hoped that the push from both internal and 
external forces for transition to democratic governance that began in the con-
tinent in the mid-1980s would provide each African country with institutional 
arrangements that were capable of enhancing constitutionalism and prevent-
ing military officers from intervening in national politics.235 In fact, after the 
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EGYPT IN 891 DAYS 225 (2016) (examining the rise and fall of Mohamed Morsi, in Egypt). 
 235 See, e.g., John Makum Mbaku, Constitutionalism and the Transition on Democratic 
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fall of the racially-based apartheid regime in South Africa and the subsequent 
introduction, through a progressive constitution, of a non-racial democratic 
system, there was renewed interest throughout Africa in constitutional gov-
ernment and constitutionalism.236 
As authoritarian regimes collapsed and gave way to the establishment of 
more democratic, participatory, and inclusive governance systems, it was gen-
erally believed that the era of the military coup or non-constitutional regime 
change had finally come to an end. Unfortunately, the governing processes 
that emerged in many African countries in the post-1990s period were not 
capable of fully and effectively constraining the military and preventing its 
officers from acting opportunistically and intervening in government. In ad-
dition, in countries such as Burkina Faso, Chad, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, and The Gambia, military elites who had come to power through force 
turned themselves into civilian presidents through carefully controlled elec-
tions.237 Through this process, the military remained an integral part of gov-
ernance in these countries and continued to engage in practices that were an-
tithetical to the rule of law and constitutional government. 
For example, Blaise Compaoré, who came to power in Burkina Faso 
through a military coup in 1987, carefully manipulated his country’s transition 
to democracy and turned himself into a civilian ruler.238 He and his ruling 
coalition, the Organisation pour la Démocratie Populaire/Mouvement du 
Travail (ODP/MT), subsequently drafted and adopted a new constitution that 
introduced multiparty competition.239 Nevertheless, “repression of political 
dissidents (including many university students) continued, and government 
control over preelection campaigning and media led opposition parties to boy-
cott the December 1991 presidential elections.”240 Through the manipulation 
of the electoral process, as well as the use of various methods of repression, 
Compaoré remained in office until he was forced out by a popular youth revolt 
in October 2014.241 As a consequence, the transition to democratic 
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2020] THREATS TO THE RULE OF LAW IN AFRICA 335 
governance in Burkina Faso was still-born and the country failed to provide 
itself with a governing process undergirded by the rule of law or constitution-
alism. 
Lieutenant Yahya Jammeh came to power in The Gambia after overthrow-
ing the government of Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara on July 22, 1994.242 Sir Ja-
wara had served as The Gambia’s Prime Minister from independence (Febru-
ary 18, 1965) to 1970 and as President from 1970 to 1994.243 Jammeh’s coup 
was considered an “outlier event” for a region that, since the early-1990s, had 
been moving away from “unconstitutional forms of regime change, such as 
the military coup.”244 The Gambia gained independence from Great Britain 
on February 18, 1965 and, prior to 1989, was one of only a few countries in 
the West Africa region that could boast of a functioning democratic political 
system.245 
After the 1994 coup, Jammeh and other members of the Armed Forces 
Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC) went on to destroy The Gambia’s op-
portunity to develop and sustain a governing process undergirded or charac-
terized by adherence to the rule of law and the practice of constitutionalism.246 
In fact, Jammeh remained in power as President of The Gambia until he was 
forced out in 2017.247 On December 1, 2016, The Gambia held presidential 
elections in which incumbent Jammeh was a candidate for re-election. When 
preliminary results of the election were released on December 2, 2016, it was 
determined that Jammeh had lost to Adama Barrow of the Coalition 2016.248 
In a statement on national television following the announcement of the re-
sults, Jammeh conceded to and congratulated the winner.249 
However, on December 9, 2016, Jammeh changed his mind and told the 
nation that he would not accept the results of the December 1, 2016 electoral 
exercise and that he would not vacate the office of the president of The 
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Gambia.250 Claiming that there had been several irregularities in the election, 
he called for new elections.251 Jammeh’s unwillingness to leave office was 
condemned by many civil society organizations in The Gambia, as well as the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African 
Union (“AU”).252 Although the diplomatic missions of many countries in The 
Gambia’s capital city Banjul, as well as several African heads of state, pleaded 
with Jammeh to leave office and allow the transition to proceed, he refused.253 
Jammeh was, however, eventually forced out of office with the help of a mil-
itary force from ECOWAS called ECOMIG.254 Subsequently, the country’s 
democratically elected President, Adama Barrow, was able to return to the 
country from Senegal. Since then, he has been working hard to return consti-
tutionalism and the rule of law to The Gambia.255 
The late Victor T. Le Vine, a scholar of African political economy, exam-
ined the challenges presented to constitutionalism and the rule of law in Africa 
by military coups. He concluded that “[o]verall, in both francophone and an-
glophone West Africa, it was the military régimes that epitomized the low 
estate to which constitutionalism had fallen during 1963–89.”256 He continued 
and stated: 
Not only did they [i.e., the military] commit acts which in 
themselves amply spoke to their disdain of the rule of law, but 
after taking power, they frequently suspended or discarded ex-
isting constitutions, to be removed from sight as offensive 
remnants of previous régimes, and then (more often than not 
in order to help legitimise [sic] their own rule) proceeded to 
write new ones to suit themselves.257 
In general, military coups either beget more military intervention, as oc-
curred, for example, in Nigeria, or the military who took control of the appa-
ratus of government through force went on to maintain governmental regimes 
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that adhered neither to the rule of law nor to constitutionalism. As argued by 
Le Vine, “[e]ven when the armed forces intervened ostensibly to ‘save’ or 
‘uphold’ a constitution—as in Ghana in 1966, or in Nigeria in 1975/6—their 
own vision tended to be strictly utilitarian; that is, seeing constitutions as con-
ditional charters to ‘clean’ and ‘sanitize’ civilian régimes.”258 African military 
plotters who seek to overthrow the government “place [themselves] outside 
the law and . . . show contempt for institutions or authorities.”259 Minabere 
Ibelema has noted that “[w]ith few exceptions, military coups in Africa were 
met with press and popular support. Coup announcements typically engender 
widespread jubilation on the streets and fawning editorials in newspapers.”260 
He went on to argue that “[t]he primary reason is that when people are in 
economic distress or under political turmoil, the natural tendency is to seek a 
messiah to deliver them.”261 However, as argued by Mbaku: 
Contrary to the pronouncements of these military elites in the 
immediate aftermath of the coups, which included claims that 
they had intervened to save the country from corrupt and op-
portunistic civilian-led regimes, the military regimes were, 
more often than not, characterized by levels of corruption and 
other forms of impunity that were actually higher than those 
obtaining in the civilian regimes that the military had over-
thrown.262 
Since the Free Officers Movement took control of the government of 
Egypt in 1952, the military coup and military elites have remained an im-
portant part of political economy in many African countries.263 In addition to 
the fact that military rule has stunted economic growth and development, it 
has also had a significantly negative impact on political development. In fact, 
African countries whose political systems have been dominated and con-
trolled by military elites (whether in or out of uniform) have not been able to 
promote the rule of law and the practice of constitutional government.264 
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D. The Constitutional Coup as a Threat to the Rule of Law 
 
In recent years, another type of coup, which does not involve the military, 
has emerged as a major threat to the rule of law and constitutional government 
in African countries. This is called the constitutional coup and it “involves the 
amending or revising of the constitution to eliminate presidential term limits, 
and allows the incumbent to [unconstitutionally] extend his mandate.”265 
Mbaku has extended this definition to include additional constitutional 
changes, which not only can extend the incumbent’s stay in power, “but also 
[have] the potential of: ‘“(1) eliminating opponents to the regime and their 
organizations; (2) silencing regime critics; (3) minimizing political competi-
tion; and (4) generally supporting regime impunity.’”266 
Mbaku then goes on to provide what he argues is a more comprehensive 
and robust definition of the constitutional coup. He states that a: 
constitutional coup is evidenced by revision or amendment of 
the constitution to: (1) eliminate presidential term limits; (2) 
eliminate presidential age limits; (3) change citizenship re-
quirements for candidates to the position of president—such a 
change is expected to invalidate the eligibility of opposition 
candidates; (4) change residency requirements for candidates 
to the position of president; and (5) grant the incumbent pres-
ident immunity from prosecution for crimes committed while 
in power.267 
Constitutional coups, argues Mbaku, also include:  
(1) manipulating the interpretation of constitutional provisions 
to postpone elections indefinitely and allow the incumbent 
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whose mandate has expired to unconstitutionally stay in 
power;268 (2) manipulating electoral and other laws in order to 
disqualify political opponents and extend the incumbent’s 
mandate or ensure an electoral win for the incumbent; and (3) 
changing the electoral laws to disqualify other candidates for 
the presidency.269 
In 1996, then President of the Republic of Zambia, Frederick J. Chiluba, 
changed the constitution to disqualify the candidacy of former and independ-
ence president, Kenneth David Kaunda, in the presidential election that was 
scheduled for November 18, 1996.270 Chiluba and the ruling Movement for 
Multiparty Democracy (“MMD”) changed the constitution to require that all 
candidates for the presidency of the Republic of Zambia have parents who 
were both Zambians by birth.271 President Chiluba, the MMD and those Zam-
bians who engineered the constitutional amendments were quite aware of the 
fact that, although Kaunda was a Zambian citizen who had led the country to 
independence in 1964 and had served as president from 1964 to 1991, his 
parents were born in what was then the British colony of Nyasaland and which 
gained independence as Malawi on July 6, 1964. Under the amended consti-
tution, Kaunda was not eligible to participate in the 1996 election as a candi-
date for the presidency.272 
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Félix Houphouët-Boigny ruled Côte d’Ivoire from independence in 1960 
until his death in office on December 7, 1993.273 After his death, there was a 
power struggle between Henri Konan Bédié, who at the time was the President 
of the National Assembly, and Alassane Ouattara, who was the country’s 
Prime Minister.274 Bédié won and assumed the position of interim President 
of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire and Ouattara resigned as Prime Minister on 
December 9, 1993.275 In preparation for presidential elections, which were 
scheduled for October 22, 1995 to select an individual to serve as the coun-
try’s permanent president, Bédié changed the electoral code.276 The new elec-
toral code required that a candidate for the presidency was required to have 
parents who were Ivorian citizens by birth.277 At the time, it was generally 
believed that the parents of then Prime Minister, Alassane Ouattara, were born 
in Burkina Faso.278 As a consequence, under the new electoral code, Ouattara 
was not qualified to participate in the October 22, 1995 presidential elec-
tions.279 
Bédié eventually won the 1995 election and went on to become the Presi-
dent of Côte d’Ivoire.280 However, his government was overthrown through a 
military rebellion that began on December 24, 1999.281 Out of the chaotic mil-
itary rebellion emerged General Robert Guéï, who was Bédié’s Chief of Staff, 
to lead the nation.282 Guéï eventually formed a relatively inclusive govern-
ment, which included members of the opposition.283 Nevertheless, Guéï and 
his government soon turned to xenophobia, especially against immigrants and 
their descendants, many of whom were Muslim and supporters of the main 
opposition leader, Ouattara.284 In 2000, Guéï’s government produced a new 
constitution, which was approved by a referendum that was held during the 
period July 23–24, 2000.285 The new constitution codified the requirements 
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for presidential candidates that were introduced into the electoral code by the 
Bédié government.286 As a result, Alassane Ouattara was ruled ineligible for 
participation in the presidential election that was scheduled for October 22, 
2000.287 
In 2019, an Egyptian Parliament made up primarily of supporters of Pres-
ident Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi, approved a menu of proposed constitutional 
amendments that would allow el-Sisi to remain in power until 2034.288 In ad-
dition to providing el-Sisi with the right to remain in office for fifteen more 
years, the new constitutional amendments would also “further enshrine the 
authority of the [Egyptian] Armed Forces in ‘maintaining the foundations of 
the civil state.’”289 During the last few decades or so, several African presi-
dents, including those of Algeria (Abdelaziz Bouteflika), Burkina Faso 
(Blaise Compaoré), Burundi (Pierre Nkurunziza); Cameroon (Paul Biya), 
Chad (Idriss Déby), Gabon (Omar Bongo), Namibia (Sam Nujoma), Niger 
(Tandja Mamadou), Rwanda (Paul Kagame), Togo (Étienne Gnassingbé Ey-
adéma), Tunisia (Zine el Abidine Ben Ali), Uganda (Yoweri Museveni), and 
Zambia (Frederick Chiluba), have changed or attempted to amend their na-
tional constitutions to remain in office indefinitely.290 It appears that the con-
stitutional coup remains a major threat to the rule of law in Africa. 
 
E. Political Interference with the Judiciary 
 
Another important threat to the rule of law in Africa is the failure of many 
countries to constitutionally guarantee judicial independence. In fact, many 
national executives and other political elites regularly interfere with the func-
tioning of the judiciary in “a fair, rational, objective and predictable man-
ner.”291 As a consequence, many judicial decisions are influenced 
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significantly by political considerations. For example, in 1996, Cameroon 
amended its constitution and introduced separation of powers, with what was 
supposed to be an independent judiciary. Article 37 deals with judicial power 
and states that “[j]udicial power shall be exercised by the Supreme Court, 
Courts of Appeal and Tribunals. The Judicial Power shall be independent of 
the executive and legislative powers.”292 However, the same constitution also 
grants the President of the Republic, one of the three branches of government, 
the power to guarantee judicial independence.293 
The President of the Republic of Cameroon is expected to guarantee the 
independence of judicial power by appointing “members of the bench and of 
the legal department”294 and by taking “disciplinary action against judicial and 
legal officers.”295 Despite these constitutional provisions, argues Charles 
Manga Fombad, an expert on Cameroon constitutional law, the President of 
the Republic of Cameroon continues to “appoint, transfer, dismiss, suspend 
and can interfere with the so-called judicial power with no constitutional pro-
visions to control and ensure that this is done in a fair, rational, objective and 
predictable manner.”296 In addition, Cameroon’s Supreme Court, which is the 
country’s highest court, is located within the Ministry of Justice, which is a 
“cabinet department within the Presidency of the Republic, and thus, under 
the control of the executive.”297 
In its 2018 report on human rights in Cameroon, the U.S. Department of 
State notes that “[d]espite the [Cameroon] judiciary’s partial independence 
from the executive and legislative branches, the president [of the Republic of 
Cameroon] appoints all members of the bench and legal department of the 
judicial branch, including the president of the Supreme Court, and may 
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dismiss them at will.”298 The U.S. Department of State report states further 
that Cameroon’s “court system is subordinate to the Ministry of Justice, which 
in turn is under the president.”299 In addition, “[t]he constitution designates 
the president as ‘first magistrate,’ thus ‘chief’ of the judiciary, making him 
the legal arbiter of any sanctions against the judiciary.”300 Although the con-
stitution states that “[m]agistrates of the bench shall, in the discharge of their 
duties, be governed only by the law and their conscience,”301 it is often the 
case that in some legal matters that come before a court, judges are “subordi-
nate to the minister of justice or to the minister in charge of military jus-
tice.”302 For example, “[w]ith approval from the minister of justice, the Spe-
cial Criminal Court may drop charges against a defendant who offers to pay 
back the money he is accused of having embezzled, which essentially renders 
the act of corruption free of sanctions.”303 
As argued by Fombad, all of Cameroon’s executives304 have been in total 
control of the judicial branch of government, and they have been able to do so 
through their ability to appoint and dismiss judicial officers as well as control 
the budgets of the judiciary.305 In addition, Fombad argues that in Cameroon, 
the judiciary functions essentially as “allies and partners of the executive in 
enjoying the spoils of power.”306 He provides an example of how the execu-
tive manipulates and controls the judiciary, especially during elections. 
In Cameroon, argues Fombad, “[j]udges preside over the divisional elec-
tion supervisory and vote-counting commissions which tabulate election re-
sults, which are then sent to the national vote-counting commission.”307 The 
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Supreme Court, which is under the control of the Ministry of Justice—a cab-
inet department within the Presidency of the Republic—”verifies and pro-
claims [the] results” of each election.308 During each election, the president 
engages in activities that ensure that any election-related disputes resolved by 
the judiciary are done so in his favor and that of his supporters.309 
For example, during the 1996 and 1997 elections, Biya took action that 
would ensure that the judiciary remained loyal and resolve any election-re-
lated disputes in his favor. He issued a “presidential decree [that] doubled [ju-
dicial] salaries, and in the case of Supreme Court judges,” there was an “in-
crease of almost 200 percent” and it came with “numerous perks and 
privileges.”310 In addition to the fact that all the judges of the Supreme Court 
are appointed by the President of the Republic, “prior to each election there 
are judicial promotions, appointments and transfers to ensure that compliant 
judges are placed in strategic positions.”311 Rather than serve as a “credible 
check” on the exercise of government power, the Cameroon judiciary and its 
officers have, instead, functioned essentially “[a]s the malleable instruments 
of politicians who are the most prominent purveyors of corruption.”312 
Cameroon, of course, is not an exception when it comes to the lack of ef-
fective independence by the judiciary. Throughout the continent, the judicial 
systems of many African countries are not able to function independently of 
the executive branch of government. Specifically, judges in the judicial sys-
tems of many African countries do not have “security of tenure,” “financial 
security,” or “institutional independence,” which are very important elements 
of judicial independence.313 In Valente v. The Queen, the Supreme Court of 
Canada defined minimum requirements for judicial independence: these are 
(1) “security of tenure,” (2) “financial security” free from “arbitrary interfer-
ence by the Executive in a manner that could affect judicial independence,” 
and “institutional independence with respect to the judicial function . . . [and] 
judicial control over the administrative decisions that bear directly and imme-
diately on the exercise of the judicial function.”314 
But, what about the reforms that began in the continent in the early-1990s? 
Did they not enhance judicial independence in many countries on the conti-
nent? Many of the African countries that engaged in institutional reforms in 
the early-1990s actually provided themselves with constitutions that guaran-
tee the independence of the judiciary.315 Post-apartheid South Africa was one 
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of the countries that undertook reforms to provide itself with a new constitu-
tion and one that provided for separation of powers with judicial independ-
ence. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (No. 108 of 1996) 
states that 
(1) The judicial authority of the Republic is vested in the 
courts. 
(2) The courts are independent and subject only to the Consti-
tution and the law, which they must apply impartially and 
without fear, favor or prejudice. 
(3) No person or organ of state may interfere with the func-
tioning of the courts. 
(4) Organs of state, through legislative and other measures, 
must assist and protect the courts to ensure the independence, 
impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the 
courts. 
(5) An order or decision issued by a court binds all persons to 
whom and organs of state to which it applies.316 
In addition to the fact that South Africa’s constitution guarantees judicial 
independence, the country’s highest court, the Constitutional Court (CC), has 
recognized the independence of the judiciary in several of its rulings. The CC 
has held that “judicial independence . . . is foundational to and indispensable 
for the discharge of the judicial function in a constitutional democracy based 
on the rule of law.”317 In its ruling in De Lange v. Smuts, the CC endorsed the 
view expressed by the Supreme Court of Canada in the case Valente v. The 
Queen regarding judicial independence.318 In another case, the CC held that: 
The Constitution thus not only recognises [sic] that courts are 
independent and impartial, but also provides important institu-
tional protection for courts. The provisions of section 165, 
forming part of the Constitution that is the supreme law, apply 
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to all courts and judicial officers, including magistrates’ courts 
and magistrates. These provisions bind the judiciary and the 
government and are enforceable by the superior courts, includ-
ing this Court.319 
Through its rulings, the CC has clarified the nature of judicial independ-
ence in the country. It has made clear that judicial independence has two im-
portant dimensions, namely, (1) individual independence, which mandates 
that when judges adjudicate cases, they must act independently and impar-
tially; and (2) institutional independence, which requires that the country pro-
vide “specific structures and guarantees . . . so that judicial officers and the 
courts are adequately protected against interference from external actors.”320 
External actors include other branches of government—for example, the ex-
ecutive, who is likely to come before the courts.321 
South Africa’s post-apartheid judiciary has, in its rulings, exercised a sig-
nificant level of independence. When the judiciary has been called upon to 
check the exercise of government power, it has done so without succumbing 
to political pressure. For example, shortly after then President of the Republic 
of South Africa, Jacob Zuma, took unilateral action322 to withdraw the country 
from the International Criminal Court (ICC), a civil society organization, and 
the country’s main opposition political party to the ruling African National 
Congress (ANC), the Democratic Alliance (DA), argued that the decision to 
withdraw South Africa from the Rome Statute of the ICC was unconstitutional 
because the South African Parliament was not consulted as required by the 
national constitution.323 The DA subsequently initiated legal action to force 
the government to abandon its effort to withdraw South Africa from the Rome 
Statute.324 
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Specifically, the DA argued that “[t]he notice of withdrawal [was] in 
breach of section 231 of the Constitution [of South Africa, 1996], as it was 
delivered without first securing a resolution of Parliament authorizing with-
drawal from the Rome Statute.”325 On February 22, 2017, the Gauteng Divi-
sion of the South African High Court at Pretoria held, in the case Democratic 
Alliance v. Minister of International Relations and Cooperation and Others 
(Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution Intervening), 
that the president did not have the authority to terminate an existing interna-
tional agreement and ordered the government to revoke the notice of with-
drawal.326 Specifically, the court held that “the decision of the executive to 
deliver the notice of withdrawal from the Rome Statute of the ICC without the 
requisite prior parliamentary approval violated section 231 of the South Afri-
can Constitution and was a breach of the principle of separation of powers.”327 
Subsequently, on March 7, 2017, the government of South Africa accepted 
the court ruling and revoked the notice of withdrawal from the Rome Stat-
ute.328 
In the violence that gripped Kenya in the aftermath of the presidential elec-
tion in December 2007, the country engaged in constitutional discourse to 
produce a new constitution.329 The result of this nation-wide reform effort is 
the Constitution of the Republic of Kenya, 2010.330 That constitution provided 
for the separation of powers with an independent judiciary.331 It states that 
“[i]n the exercise of judicial authority, the Judiciary . . . shall be subject only 
to this Constitution and the law shall not be subject to the control or direction 
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of any person or authority.”332 The Constitution also granted the Supreme 
Court the power to answer all questions related to the validity of presidential 
elections. Specifically, the Constitution states as follows: 
(1) A person may file a petition in the Supreme Court to chal-
lenge the election of the President-elect within seven days after 
the date of the declaration of the results of the presidential 
election. 
(2) Within fourteen days after the filing of a petition under 
clause (1), the Supreme Court shall hear and determine the pe-
tition and its decision shall be final.333 
On August 8, 2017, general elections were held in Kenya to elect the Pres-
ident, members of Parliament, and officials for various sub-national govern-
ments.334 The official results showed that incumbent president, Uhuru Ken-
yatta, had been re-elected with 54.27 percent of the votes cast.335 The main 
opposition leader, Raila Odinga, received 44.74 percent of the votes.336 
Shortly after the results were released, Odinga argued that the election had 
been marred with many irregularities and that the results were “hacked and 
rigged in favour [sic] of the incumbent” (i.e., Uhuru Kenyatta).337 Odinga and 
his supporters subsequently took their case to the Supreme Court.338 On Sep-
tember 1, 2017, the Supreme Court rendered its historic decision in which it 
stated that the electoral commission had “failed, neglected, or refused to con-
duct the presidential election in a manner consistent with the dictates of the 
Constitution.”339 And, in accordance with § 140(3) of the Constitution, the 
Supreme Court ordered that “a fresh election shall be held within sixty days” 
to select a new President-elect.340 The September 1, 2017 ruling by the Kenya 
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Supreme Court was considered very important because it was the first time in 
the history of independent Kenya that the courts had successfully stood up to 
what had, since independence, evolved into an imperial presidency.341 
The independence exhibited by the Constitutional Court in South Africa 
and the Supreme Court of Kenya has contributed significantly to the gradual 
evolution of a culture of adherence to the rule of law in these countries. Un-
fortunately, this has not been the case in many other countries on the conti-
nent. Although many of them have constitutions that guarantee judicial inde-
pendence, these guarantees remain essentially parchment barriers to the abuse 
of executive power, which, unfortunately, do not have any practical effects. 
The Founders of the American Republic recognized this problem, that is, that 
parchment barriers alone cannot protect government tyranny; there must exist 
a robust and effective governing process, one that adequately guards the gov-
ernment and prevents civil servants and political elites from acting with im-
punity.342 
In her study of judicial independence and its relation to the protection of 
human rights, Keith states that many legal scholars and political scientists 
have asserted that judicial independence “is the indispensable link in the ma-
chinery for securing individual protection against states’ human rights 
abuses.”343 Monica Macovei, in a study of the protection of human rights by 
the judiciary in Romania, argues that “[a]s a necessary check on the potential 
excesses of both the executive and legislative branches, only an independent 
and impartial judiciary may effectively guarantee the protection of human 
rights.”344 
International organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) and the In-
ternational Bar Association (IBA) recognize the “nexus between the inde-
pendence of the judiciary and human rights”345 and have produced resolutions 
that “enumerate an independent judiciary as one of the essential elements for 
safeguarding human rights.”346 In addition to the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
UN “has set forth standards for achieving an independent judiciary in its Basic 
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Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary.”347 Noting that “the U.N. 
principles represent a substantial degree of global consensus on what judicial 
independence is or should be,”348 Keith constructs “seven ordinal 
measures”349 for what can be described as “the seven key constitutional ele-
ments necessary to produce an independent judiciary able to safeguard human 
rights.”350 These key indicators of judicial independence are (1) a ban against 
exceptional or military courts; (2) separation of powers; (3) exclusive author-
ity; (4) finality of decisions; (5) enumerated qualifications; (6) guaranteed 
terms; and (7) fiscal autonomy.351 
Several legal scholars have studied judicial independence in Nigeria under 
the Fourth Republic, which came into being with the Constitution of the Fed-
eral Republic of Nigeria, 1999.352 In one such study, Professor Philip Aka 
states that “[a] judicial tribunal’s independence breathes life into the liberties 
guaranteed for citizens in a national constitution, and promotes human 
rights.”353 Aka adds that judicial independence is also “imperative for rooting 
the culture of the rule of law.”354 In fact, the ability of the courts to operate 
freely and without political interference and deliver justice timely and fairly 
directly affects the people’s trust in the law and hence, is a major determinant 
of people’s willingness to voluntarily accept, respect, and obey the law. 
In every country, judges and the courts are tasked with the responsibility 
to make decisions that affect people’s lives, their freedoms, rights, as well as 
their property. According to the UN’s Basic Principles on the Independence 
of the Judiciary, “judges are charged with the ultimate decision over life, free-
doms, rights, duties and property of citizens.”355 Unless the judiciary is inde-
pendent of outside influence and interference, it is not likely that it would be 
able to successfully carry out or undertake these duties. 
In his study of judicial independence in Nigeria, Professor Aka uses the 
seven indicators of judicial independence developed by Keith to determine the 
extent to which the judiciary in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic is independent. The 
ban against exceptional or military courts prohibits the trial of citizens by 
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extraordinary tribunals and this is in accordance with the Basic Principles on 
Judicial Independence that “[e]veryone shall have the right to be tried by or-
dinary courts or tribunals using established legal procedures.”356 Specifically, 
“[t]ribunals that do not use the duly established procedures of the legal process 
shall not be created to displace the jurisdiction belonging to the ordinary 
courts or judicial tribunals.”357 Aka argues that this right, as stated in the Basic 
Principles on Judicial Independence, is “the testament that the people, rather 
than solely the judges, are the ultimate beneficiaries of judicial independ-
ence.”358 
In some African countries, one can find “special courts” that are granted 
the power to operate without the benefit of “the duly established procedures 
of the legal process” and that “displace the jurisdiction belonging to ordinary 
courts or judicial tribunals.”359 An example is Cameroon’s Special Criminal 
Court (“SCC”), which was created in 2011 to adjudicate cases involving the 
embezzlement of public funds and to force those convicted to restore the prop-
erty stolen.360 Although some scholars have argued that a court, such as Cam-
eroon’s SCC, is “an example to emulate and confirms that corruption can be 
fought if and only if the political will to do so is present,”361 others have ar-
gued that the SCC, like other judicial institutions in Cameroon, is subject to 
manipulation by senior-level civil servants and politicians for their own ben-
efit and that of their benefactors.362 
The second key indicator of judicial independence is the separation of 
powers, “which requires that the authority of the judicial branch be formally 
separated from the authority of the executive and legislative branches, who 
must also refrain from taking any steps likely to endanger the independence 
of judges.”363 The Basic Principles on Judicial Independence mandate that 
“judicial independence [should] ‘be guaranteed by the State and enshrined in 
the Constitution or the law of the country.’”364 More importantly, the Basic 
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Principles on Judicial Independence state that “[i]t is the duty of all govern-
mental and other institutions to respect and observe the independence of the 
judiciary.”365 Unfortunately, for many African countries, while national con-
stitutions may guarantee judicial independence, civil servants and political 
elites in these countries have refused to accept, respect and “observe the inde-
pendence of the judiciary.”366 
It is important, for the sake of enhancing judicial independence, that the 
judiciary must not be housed within either the executive or legislative 
branches. The judiciary must be housed in a branch that is separate from either 
the executive or legislative branch in order to minimize political interference 
with the country’s court system. Yet, in Cameroon and many Francophone 
countries, the Supreme Court, the country’s highest court, is actually housed 
within the Ministry of Justice, a cabinet position within the executive branch 
of government. It is no wonder that the president and members of his cabinet 
routinely interfere with judicial deliberations and rulings, a process that has 
seriously undermined the rule of law in each of these countries.367 
The third indicator of judicial independence is that courts be granted “ex-
clusive authority” to adjudicate cases “based on their own competence and 
free from unwarranted pressures of any type.”368 The Basic Principles on Ju-
dicial Independence mandate that the judiciary be granted exclusive “jurisdic-
tion over all issues of a judicial nature,” as well as the “exclusive authority to 
decide whether an issue submitted for its decision is within its competence as 
defined by law.”369 In order for the rule of law to function in a country, the 
judiciary must have the authority to deal with all issues of a judicial nature 
and, in addition, be granted the authority to determine which matters fall 
within the jurisdiction of the courts. 
The fourth indicator of judicial independence is the finality of court deci-
sions. This indicates that “decisions of judges [must] not be subject to any 
revision outside the appeal procedures by the law.”370 The Basic Principles on 
Judicial Independence support this principle, stating that “[t]here shall not be 
any inappropriate or unwarranted interference with the judicial process, nor 
shall judicial decisions by the courts be subject to revision.”371 
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Interference with the performance of the judicial function by state- and, to 
a certain extent, non-state actors, is one of the most important constraints to 
the rule of law in African countries. Judges and judicial institutions must be 
safeguarded from political interference, which can severely handicap their 
ability to perform their functions and contribute to the maintenance of the rule 
of law. 
The fifth indicator deals with the selection of judicial officers. Those who 
serve in positions in the judicial system must be individuals who are fully 
qualified as judged by their “professional qualifications, ability, and integ-
rity.”372 While it is important, especially for African countries, that staffing of 
the courts reflect the diversity of each country, judicial appointments should 
not be based solely on political considerations—individuals who serve in the 
judiciary must possess the required professional qualifications and must also 
adhere to the rules of professional conduct for lawyers and judges. The Inter-
national Bar Association (IBA) Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence 
provide some advice on what role, if any, the executive should play in the 
hiring of judicial officers.373 The IBA Minimum Standards state that “[p]ar-
ticipation in judicial appointments and promotions by the executive or legis-
lature is not inconsistent with judicial independence provided that appoint-
ments and promotions of judges are vested in a judicial body in which 
members of judiciary and the legal profession form a majority.”374 
Aka argues that the main reason for making certain that judicial officers 
are only selected based on “merit factors”375 is to ensure that the judiciary is 
staffed only by individuals who can “perform their functions competently, and 
who have been socialized to the norms of judicial independence.”376 Such a 
caliber of professionals is likely to be able to resist corruption by the execu-
tive. 
With respect to the disciplining of judges, a process that has been used by 
many African presidents to influence their national judiciaries, the IBA states 
that “[t]he power to discipline or remove a judge must be vested in an institu-
tion, which is independent of the Executive” and that that power “should pref-
erably be vested in a judicial tribunal.”377 The IBA, nevertheless, prescribes a 
role for the executive in the disciplining of judicial officers. It states that “[t]he 
Executive may participate in the discipline of judges only in referring com-
plaints against judges, or in the initiation of disciplinary proceedings, but not 
 
 372 Aka, supra note 353, at 13. 
 373 INT’L BAR ASSOC., IBA MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
(1982),https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uloads/2014/10/IBA_Resolutions_Minimum_Stan 
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 374 Id. at § 3(a) (emphasis added). 
 375 Aka, supra note 353, at 13. 
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the adjudication of such matters.”378 More specifically, the IBA states that 
“[t]he Executive shall not have control over judicial functions.”379 
The sixth indicator of judicial independence requires that the “constitution 
guarantees judges’ terms of office, governing their appointment, discipline, 
and removal from office.”380 Professor Aka then argues that this indicator is 
consistent with provisions of the IBA’s Minimum Standards of Judicial Inde-
pendence, which state that “[t]he position of the judges, their independence, 
their security, and their adequate remuneration shall be secured by law,”381 
and that the remuneration of judges and other judicial officers shall not “be 
decreased during the judges’ services, except as a coherent part of an overall 
public economic measure.”382 
The last indicator of judicial independence is “fiscal autonomy” and re-
quires that the judiciary be “provided with adequate resources allowing it to 
properly perform its functions while insulating it from possible financial ret-
ribution of an abusive regime.”383 In order for judicial officers to perform their 
functions properly, they must be guaranteed financial security. This is in line 
with the minimum requirements for judicial independence defined by the Su-
preme Court of Canada in the case Valente v. The Queen.384 
After ruling the country for nearly 30 years,385 the Nigerian military pro-
duced a new constitution386 and handed the apparatus of government to an 
elected civilian regime in 1999.387 Professor Aka has studied judicial 
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 384 See Valente v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673 (Can.). In this case, the Canadian 
Supreme Court elaborated three minimum conditions for judicial independence. First is 
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exercise of its judicial function.” Id. at 4. 
 385 The military ruled Nigeria during the periods 1966–1979 and 1983–1999. See 
Norimitsu Onishi, Nigeria’s Military Turns Over Power to Elected Leader, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 30, 1999), https://www.nytimes.com/1999/05/30/world/nigeria-s-military-turns-ove 
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50 Years On, BBC (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35312370. 
 386 See CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999). This constitution ushered in Nigeria’s Fourth 
Republic, with former military leader, Olusegun Obasanjo, as its first elected president. 
 387 See Onishi, supra note 385. 
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independence in Nigeria under the Fourth Republic and determined the fol-
lowing: the country’s constitution “contains ample provisions relating to ju-
dicial independence.”388 Professor Aka then goes on to argue that “[e]ntrench-
ment of these provisions in the constitution [of Nigeria] as ground norm or 
basic law of the land signifies that an independent judiciary is a value that 
Nigerians cherish.”389 
Professor Aka then uses the seven indicators of judicial independence to 
determine the extent to which the provisions of Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution 
conform with these provisions.390 He concludes that the institutional arrange-
ments of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic meet all the indicators, except that dealing 
with fiscal autonomy.391 In analyzing the problems and failures of the judici-
ary in Nigeria, Okechukwu Oko argues that “[b]oth the appearance and reality 
of independence demand that the judiciary should have complete control over 
its funds.”392 This speaks directly to one of the minimum requirements for 
judicial independence defined by the Supreme Court of Canada in the case 
Valente v. The Queen393 and adopted by the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa in the cases De Lange v. Smuts394 and Van Rooyen v. The State.395 In 
its ruling, the Supreme Court of Canada identified “financial security” free 
from “arbitrary interference by the Executive in a manner that could affect 
judicial independence” as one of the minimum requirements for judicial inde-
pendence.396 This part of judicial independence—that is, financial security—
is provided for in the U.S. Constitution at Article III, section one, which states 
that “[t]he Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their 
Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their 
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Contin-
uance in Office.”397 
In his study of judicial independence in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, Profes-
sor Aka determined that although constitutional provisions seem to guarantee 
 
 388 Aka, supra note 353, at 26. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA § 231(1–2) (dealing 
with the appointment of the Chief Justice of Nigeria); § 238(1) (dealing with the appoint-
ment of the President of the Court of Appeal); § 238(2) (dealing with the appointment of a 
Justice of the Court of Appeal); § 250(1) (dealing with appointment of a person to the 
Office of Chief Judge of the Federal High Court); § 271(1) (dealing with appointment of a 
person to the Office of Chief Judge of a State); § 271(2) (dealing with appointment of a 
person to the Office of a Judge of a High Court of a State). 
 389 Aka, supra note 353, at 27. 
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judicial independence, the reality is that fiscal autonomy is lacking for judges 
and the judiciary.398 Rather, “under the Fourth Republic, the President con-
trols funds allocated to the judiciary, impelling judges to ‘depend on the good-
will of the executive branch for funding.’”399 Such financial dependence seri-
ously undermines the ability of the judiciary to function independently and 
perform its constitutional duties fairly and without political interference. As 
argued by Fombad in the case of Cameroon, control of the judiciary’s finances 
by the executive has allowed the latter to turn judges and other judicial officers 
into “malleable instruments” for the advancement of the interests of the pres-
ident and his benefactors.400 
Judicial independence in Nigeria is threatened not only by the lack of fi-
nancial autonomy by the judiciary. The IBA Minimum Standards of Judicial 
Independence state that “[j]udicial appointments should generally be for life, 
subject to removal for cause and compulsory retirement at an age fixed by law 
at the date of appointment.”401 With respect to the removal of a judge, the 
Constitution of Nigeria provides the following procedure: “A judicial officer 
shall not be removed from his office or appointment before the age of retire-
ment except in the following circumstances—(a) in the case of (i) Chief Jus-
tice of Nigeria, . . . by the President acting on an address supported by two-
thirds majority of the Senate.”402 
Just three weeks before Nigeria was to hold a general election in 2019 in 
which incumbent president, Muhammadu Buhari, was a candidate for re-elec-
tion, the president suspended Chief Justice Walter Onnoghen,403 who was fac-
ing charges for allegedly failing to declare his personal assets before taking 
office in 2017.404 Although this was not an outright dismissal or removal, Jus-
tice Onnoghen’s suspension was widely criticized by both internal and exter-
nal observers for not “following legal procedures” and for not offering the 
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 402 See CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999) § 292 (1)(a)(i). 
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judge an opportunity to fully defend himself.405 Officials from the UN Human 
Rights Council argued that the removal of the Chief Justice without substan-
tive due process was “incompatible with the independence of the judiciary” 
and violated the spirit of the separation of powers.406 
The truth of the matter is that, despite constitutional guarantees, the Nige-
rian judiciary does not currently enjoy any significant level of independence. 
Despite the improvements that have been made since the introduction of de-
mocracy in 1999, Nigeria’s judiciary, like many others in Africa, does not 
enjoy the type of independence that would allow it to function effectively as 
a check on the exercise of government power and advance the rule of law. 
 
F. Understanding and Appreciating the Constitution 
 
The rule of law cannot function effectively in a country if the majority of 
citizens do not understand and appreciate the constitution, which is the coun-
try’s basic law. Throughout the continent, many people are not aware of their 
national constitution, do not understand its provisions or its role in their lives, 
and are unable to appreciate the role that the constitution plays in regulating 
their socio-political interaction.407 As argued by Professor André Mbata 
Mangu, most citizens of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) usually do 
not understand the constitution or appreciate it.408 Of course, the situation of 
the people of the DRC is not unique. Throughout the continent, many citizens 
are not aware that there exists, within their country, a basic law called the 
constitution and those who do, do not have firsthand knowledge of its con-
tents, as well as what the role of this basic law is in their daily lives.409 
Part of the reason why many citizens of the African countries are usually 
not aware of their constitutions or understand and appreciate them is directly 
related to the nature of the process through which national constitutions were 
designed and adopted. If the constitution-making process is participatory and 
inclusive—allowing all stakeholder groups or subcultures to participate—is-
sues that are important to them can become part of constitutional discourse 
and hence, could be reflected in the constitution.410 As argued by Mbaku, 
“[t]he constitution must be considered by the majority of citizens as a 
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negotiated legal mechanism to deal with the complex problems that arise from 
their socio-political interaction.”411 
Citizens must see the constitution generally and the law in particular, as a 
tool designed (i) to protect their rights; and (ii) “to organize their private 
lives—for example, to start and run a business for profit, acquire and dispose 
of property, get married, engage in contracting, protect one’s values from en-
croachment by either state or non-state actors, or otherwise engage in produc-
tive activities to create wealth.”412 Making certain that the process through 
which the constitution and post-constitutional laws are selected is “participa-
tory and inclusive achieves at least two critical objectives.”413 First is “that the 
resulting laws are locally-focused and therefore relevant to the lives of the 
people whose behaviors the laws are expected to regulate, reflecting their val-
ues.”414 Second is “that the laws are those that the people understand, respect, 
and are able and willing to obey.”415 Hence, the most effective way to make 
sure that the majority of the citizens of each African country voluntarily ac-
cept and obey their laws is “to make sure that the process through which laws 
are enacted in each country is open and transparent, and that citizens who so 
desire can participate fully.”416 
An important outcome of openness and transparency is that they can help 
citizens “know what the law is, understand the law, and make certain that the 
law reflects their values and is relevant to their lives, effectively enhancing 
compliance.”417 In addition, if the process through which the constitution, as 
well as, post-constitutional laws, is made is open and transparent, “citizens 
will be able to understand and appreciate the reason why a specific law has 
been enacted and why they must obey it.”418 Thus, openness and transparency 
contribute significantly to the ability and willingness of the majority of citi-
zens to voluntarily accept, as well as, understand and appreciate the law, ef-
fectively enhancing adherence to the rule of law. 
For many African countries, perhaps the most important reason why most 
citizens do not understand the provisions of their constitutions, including their 
Bill of Rights, is that these documents are written in languages that are alien 
to them. The majority of African countries have adopted the languages of their 
former colonizers as their official national languages. For example, the offi-
cial languages of the Republic of Cameroon,419 which at one time was 
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2020] THREATS TO THE RULE OF LAW IN AFRICA 359 
colonized by France and the United Kingdom, are English and French.420 The 
official language of Sierra Leone is English421 and that of Senegal is French.422 
The constitutions and laws of these countries are written in their official 
languages. Unfortunately, most of the citizens of these African countries are 
not literate in their countries’ official languages. As a consequence, it is very 
difficult for citizens to be familiar with laws that are written in languages that 
they cannot read or understand. In Cameroon, for example, where most gov-
ernment communication is carried out in French, significant parts of the pop-
ulation cannot participate in governance because they can neither speak nor 
understand the French language.423 
 
G. Failure to Domesticate Important International Human Rights Instruments 
 
Upholding and protecting the rule of law requires that each African coun-
try mainstream international human rights law into national law either by leg-
islation or by amending existing domestic laws where there is a contradic-
tion.424 Unfortunately, throughout the continent, many African countries have 
failed to domesticate regional and international legal instruments, especially 
those dealing with the recognition and protection of human rights. 
It has been argued that “[a]n important consequence of globalization is the 
internationalization of constitutional law.”425 African countries, like their 
counterparts in other parts of the world, must now make certain that “in con-
stitutional design and interpretation, [they] must take cognizance of interna-
tional law, particularly international human rights instruments.”426 Alarmed 
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at the atrocities that were committed during World War II, “the international 
community became quite concerned about how national governments treated 
or were treating their citizens.”427 As a consequence, when the United Nations 
was established in 1945, the global community moved very quickly to estab-
lish “minimum standards of human rights protection with monitoring bodies 
to scrutinize national performance.”428 
The international community eventually incorporated and elaborated these 
minimum standards into a UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution and 
two treaties that came to be referred to as the International Bill of Human 
Rights (IBHR). The IBHR consists of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR),429 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) with its two Optional Protocols,430 and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).431 Although the UDHR 
is only a “declaration” and, as a consequence, is not legally binding on Mem-
ber States of the UN, many of the UDHR’s provisions have been incorporated 
into “other international and regional instruments as well as national constitu-
tions.”432 Today, many of the provisions of the UDHR are “considered to ex-
press principles of customary international law.”433 
International legal scholars have argued that because of the fact that the 
provisions of the UDHR are now granted special status by many countries, 
these provisions and “other instruments which contain rules considered to be 
customary international law are automatically applicable in most common law 
countries . . . as part of national law and must therefore be taken into account 
in any interpretation of the constitution.”434 It has become imperative for 
many countries to consider the “provisions of these international human rights 
instruments, including those of the UDHR,” as limits to their sovereignty and 
“take them into consideration when interpreting their national constitutions, 
as well as when designing their constitutions and enacting post-constitutional 
laws.”435 
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Nevertheless, these international human rights instruments “do not auto-
matically confer justiciable rights in national courts.”436 However, as argued 
by Mbaku, these instruments and standards “do and can have significant im-
pact on national laws, including the constitution, how they are designed and 
how they are enforced.”437 The provisions of the constitutions of many Afri-
can countries “have been substantially influenced by international human 
rights instruments and standards.”438 For example, in the Preamble to the Con-
stitution of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, it is declared as follows: 
We, the People of Côte d’Ivoire . . . [r]eaffirm our determina-
tion to build a Rule of Law in which human rights, public free-
doms, human dignity, justice and good governance as defined 
in the international legal instruments to which the Côte 
d’Ivoire is a party, in particular the United Nations Charter of 
1945, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 1981 and 
its supplementary protocols, the Constitutive Act of the Afri-
can Union of 2001, are promoted, protected and guaranteed.439 
Does this affirmation of the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in 
the Constitution of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire and other African countries 
“make [these rights and freedoms] part of national law and hence, make the 
rights contained in these international instruments justiciable in national 
courts?”440 As argued by Professor Fombad, this affirmation,  “does not render 
any of these instruments part of national law nor can they be invoked on this 
basis alone in the interpretation of the constitution.”441 
Let us now consider the Republic of Benin, where the country’s constitu-
tional designers “have directly incorporated provisions of certain international 
human rights instruments into the national constitution.”442 In the Preamble to 
the Constitution of the Republic of Benin, the people state as follows: 
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362 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L [Vol. 48:293 
WE, THE BÉNINESE PEOPLE . . . [r]eaffirm our attachment 
to the principles of democracy and human rights as they have 
been defined by the Charter of the United Nations of 1945 and 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, by the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted in 
1981 by the Organization of African Unity and ratified by Bé-
nin on January 20, 1986 and whose provisions make up an in-
tegral part of this present Constitution and of Béninese law 
and have a value superior to the internal law.443 
In addition, Article 7 of the same constitution renders the “rights and duties 
proclaimed and guaranteed by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights . . . an integral part of the . . . Constitution [of Bénin] and of Béninese 
law.”444 The Constitution of the Republic of Benin also imposes a duty on the 
State “to assure the diffusion and the teaching of the Constitution, of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, of the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights of 1981 as well as all of the international instruments duly 
ratified and relative to human rights.”445 The Constitution of the Republic of 
Benin makes the provisions of the African Charter directly justiciable in Be-
nin’s domestic courts. The Republic of Benin, hence, has fully domesticated 
the provisions of the African Charter. 
The Republic of Angola is another African country that has made an effort 
to domesticate international human rights instruments. For example, accord-
ing to Article 26 of the Constitution of the Republic of Angola, 
1. The fundamental rights established in this Constitution shall 
not exclude others contained in the laws and applicable rules 
of international law. 
2. Constitutional and legal precepts relating to fundamental 
rights must be interpreted and incorporated in accordance with 
the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man, the African 
Charter on the Rights of Man and Peoples and international 
treaties on the subject ratified by the Republic of Angola. 
3. In any consideration by the Angolan courts of disputes con-
cerning fundamental rights, the international instruments 
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referred to in the previous point shall be applied, even if not 
invoked by the parties concerned.446 
Additional elaboration is provided in Article 27 of the Constitution of An-
gola, which states that “[t]he principles set out in this chapter shall apply to 
the rights, freedoms and guarantees and to fundamental rights of a similar na-
ture that are established in the Constitution or are enshrined in law or interna-
tional conventions.”447 Thus, Angola, like Benin, has made certain provisions 
of international human rights instruments directly justiciable in its national 
courts. 
In the aftermath of post-election violence in Kenya in 2008, the country 
embarked on concerted efforts to produce a new constitution, one that was 
expected to improve the country’s ability to practice constitutionalism and the 
rule of law. The result of Kenya’s constitutional discourse was the Constitu-
tion of the Republic of Kenya, 2010.448 The new constitution introduced a 
separation-of-powers regime with checks and balances, including an inde-
pendent judiciary.449 Kenya’s new constitution speaks directly to the applica-
bility of international law within the country and in its domestic courts. Ac-
cording to Article 2(5), “[t]he general rules of international law shall form part 
of the law of Kenya.”450 This provision effectively renders “the rules of inter-
national law” justiciable in Kenyan courts. In addition, Kenya’s constitution 
also provides another avenue for domesticating international law, when it 
states that “[a]ny treaty or convention ratified by Kenya shall form part of the 
law of Kenya under this Constitution.”451 
Unlike Angola, Benin, and Kenya, most African countries do not make 
international law part of their constitutional law. Take, for example, the Con-
stitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. While the constitution makes 
mention of international law, it fails to make provisions of the latter directly 
justiciable in the country’s courts. Article 39(1)(b), however, imposes an ob-
ligation on national courts to “consider international law” when interpreting 
the Bill of Rights.452 The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana obligates the 
government to “promote respect for international law, treaty obligations 
. . . .”453 However, Ghana’s constitution does not make any provisions of in-
ternational law directly justiciable in its national courts. 
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The failure of many countries in Africa to domesticate provisions of inter-
national law, including especially those of international human rights instru-
ments, is a threat to the practice of constitutionalism and the rule of law. In 
the African countries, domestic or national law includes not just constitutional 
and statutory law, but also the customs and traditions of each country’s vari-
ous subcultures. It has been argued that “part of the effort to develop a culture 
of human rights must include the need to make certain that none of the cus-
tomary and traditional practices of any subculture (e.g., female genital muti-
lation; virgin cleansing; the conscription of young girls to serve as slaves in 
fetish shrines; child marriage) violate provisions contained in various interna-
tional human rights instruments.”454 In many of these countries, government 
impunity is pervasive and individuals (especially members of the government) 
who abuse human rights, including those of children, are rarely ever brought 
to justice. Where national laws do not reflect the provisions of international 
human rights instruments, it is often the case that impunity is pervasive, and, 
as a result, there cannot be adherence to the rule of law and/or practice of 
constitutional government.455 
 
H. Political and Economic Exclusion and Extreme Poverty 
 
The United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) 2018 report on hu-
man development shows that of the thirty poorest and least developed coun-
tries in the world, as measured by the human development index (HDI), 
twenty-seven or 90 percent of them are found in Africa.456 Among the ex-
tremely poor African countries are Central African Republic, South Sudan, 
Burundi, Mali, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which during 
the last several years have not been able to practice constitutionalism. In fact, 
most of these countries have been embroiled in either civil war or some form 
of sectarian violence. For example, since December 2013, South Sudan has 
fought a brutal and bloody civil war that has deepened the “rift between two 
[of the country’s] largest ethnic groups—[President] Kiir’s dominant Dinka 
and [former Vice President] Machar’s Nuer people.”457 
Although Nigeria is not usually considered a poor country, it has surpassed 
India as the country that houses the largest population of people living in ex-
treme poverty.458 In 2018, as many as 86.9 million Nigerians were living in 
extreme poverty and this number is expected to increase to 120 million by the 
 
 454 Mbaku, supra note 425, at 69 n. 147. 
 455 See generally Mbaku, Struggle Against Impunity, supra note 5; Mbaku, The Rule of 
Law and the Exploitation of Children in Africa, supra note 5. 
 456 UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (UNDP), HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDICES 
AND INDICATORS: 2018 STATISTICAL UPDATE (2018). 
 457 See Winsor, supra note 16. 
 458 See Kazeem, supra note 7. 
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year 2030 representing 45.5 percent of the country’s population.459 In terms 
of percentages, South Sudan has the highest percentage (93%) of people living 
in extreme poverty, followed by DRC (77%), Mozambique (62%), and Zam-
bia (57%).460 It is estimated that by 2030, unless South Sudan can significantly 
improve its governance architecture, the percentage of citizens living in ex-
treme poverty is most likely to approximate 100 percent of the country’s pop-
ulation.461 
Studies of countries, such as South Sudan, DRC, and Central African Re-
public, show that the pervasiveness of extreme poverty is related to the exist-
ence of ineffective and dysfunctional governance systems, which are charac-
terized by the lack of adherence or fidelity to the rule of law.462 These 
countries are generally pervaded by extremely high levels of corruption, es-
pecially of the grand type, as state custodians—(i.e., civil servants and politi-
cal elites) those who control the government—use the power, granted them 
by the people through the constitution, to enrich themselves at the expense of 
their fellow citizens. 
Corruption is a major constraint to the ability of citizens to organize their 
private lives and engage in activities to create the wealth that they need to 
fight poverty and improve their quality of life.463 This is an especially serious 
problem for individuals and groups that historically have been marginalized 
and exploited by ruling majority factions. These include women, youth, urban 
poor, rural inhabitants, and ethnic and religious minorities. Some of these 
groups (e.g., the Anglophones of Cameroon),464 frustrated at their continued 
marginalization and permanent existence on the political and economic mar-
gins, have resorted to violent mobilization in an effort to either capture the 
 
 459 WORLD POVERTY CLOCK, supra note 8. 
 460 Kazeem, supra note 7. 
 461 See Jasmin Baier & Kristofer Hamel, Africa: The Last Frontier for Eradicating Ex-
treme Poverty, BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future- 
development/2018/10/17/africa-the-last-frontier-for-eradicating-extreme-poverty/. 
 462 See Mark Ferullo, Safeguards to Peace: Steps Toward Economic Governance in South 
Sudan, ENOUGH PROJECT (Mar. 2019), https://enoughproject.org/reports/safeguards-peace- 
south-sudan (noting that continued underdevelopment and poverty in South Sudan is fueled 
by pervasive corruption and violent kleptocracy); Sasha Lezhnev, A Criminal State: Un-
derstanding and Countering Institutionalized Corruption and Violence in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, ENOUGH PROJECT (Oct. 2016), https://enoughproject.org/reports/crimin 
al-state-understanding-and-countering-institutionalized-corruption-and-violence-democr 
(examining the extent to which corruption and violent kleptocracy have stunted economic 
and human development in the Democratic Republic of Congo); Yapatake Kosssele Thales 
Pacific, Fragility of State in Central African Republic: An Econometric Approach to Effi-
ciency Understanding, 21 GLOBAL BUS. REV. 1, 7 (2018) (noting that “the cause of the 
[Central African Republic’s] state fragility is corruption, which has a great influence on 
the political, economic and social stability of the country”). 
 463 See Mbaku, Rule of Law, State Capture, and Human Development in Africa, supra 
note 210, at 778. 
 464 See, e.g., Zongo, supra note 180. 
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government or, at the very least, minimize their further marginalization.465 
This violent mobilization by groups that are actually marginalized or consider 
themselves to be so, has produced the type of political and economic instabil-
ity that has threatened peace and security and endangered the practice of con-
stitutional government and adherence to the rule of law.466 
The World Justice Project (WJP) produces an annual Rule of Law Index 
that “presents a portrait of the rule of law in 126 countries by providing scores 
and rankings based on eight factors: constraints on government powers, ab-
sence of corruption, open government, fundamental rights, order and security, 
regulatory enforcement, civil justice, and criminal justice.”467 The index 
ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating the strongest level of adherence to the 
rule of law.468 Of the 30 countries that show the least level of adherence or 
fidelity to the rule of law, 18 (or 60%) of them are found in Africa.469 These 
include countries like the DRC, Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, and 
Uganda that are struggling with some form of religious extremism or violent 
mobilization by subcultures that consider themselves marginalized and 
pushed to the political and economic margins.470 
The failure of many African countries to deal fully and effectively with 
poverty, including the extreme type, is a major threat to the rule of law. This 
is a complex issue because the absence of the rule of law in these countries 
stunts entrepreneurship and the creation of the wealth that these countries need 
to confront poverty. At the same time, the existence of high levels of poverty 
forces many of the poor, who include various minority factions, to engage in 
violent mobilization, a situation that creates political instability and further 
 
 465 In 2016, lawyers, teachers, and other members of civil society engaged in peaceful 
demonstrations against the efforts of the Francophone-dominated central government to 
destroy Anglophone institutions, which included replacing the Anglophone Regions’ Com-
mon Law with French Civil law. The government responded with extreme violence, killing 
thousands of Anglophones and burning their villages. Radical Anglophone civil society 
groups responded to the central government’s brutality with force of their own and subse-
quently declared their intention to found a new country called the Republic of Ambazonia. 
Since then, the violence in Cameroon has escalated. See, e.g., Moki Edwin Kindzeka, 
Homes, Villages Burned as Cameroon Targets Separatists, VOA NEWS (Oct. 25, 2018), ht 
tps://www.voanews.com/africa/homes-villages-burned-cameroon-targets-separatists; 
Burning Cameroon: Images You’re Not Meant to See, BBC (June 25, 2018), https://www.b 
bc.com/news/world-africa-44561929; Francis Ajumane, Rights Group Says Over 100 Vil-
lages Burnt in Cameroon’s Anglophone Regions, JOURNAL DU CAMEROUN.COM (Aug. 22, 
2018), https://www.journalducameroun.com/en/rights-group-says-100-villages-burnt-cam 
eroons-anglophone-regions/. 
 466 See generally MBAKU, supra note 61 (examining sources of sectarian violence in Af-
rican countries). 
 467 WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX 2019 5 (2019), https://worldjusticepro-
ject.org/sites/default/files/documents/ROLI-2019-Reduced.pdf. 
 468 Id. at 6. 
 469 See id. 
 470 Id. at 17. 
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endangers the practice of constitutional government and adherence to the rule 
of law. The key to resolving this governance quagmire lies in institutional 
reforms to provide institutional arrangements that are capable of adequately 
guarding the government and preventing impunity. That is, each African 
country must be provided with a governing process undergirded by adherence 
to the rule of law. 
V. THE AFRICAN UNION AND THREATS TO THE RULE OF LAW IN AFRICA 
A. Introduction 
 
Shortly after the Organization of African Unity (OAU) came into being in 
1963,471 it was generally believed that the continental organization would 
help liberate the rest of the continent, accelerate the decoloni-
zation process, and help the remaining colonies, including 
apartheid South Africa, to gain their independence; promote 
democratic governance throughout the continent; advance the 
protection of human rights; and provide the enabling institu-
tional environment for the creation of the wealth that was 
needed to deal fully and effectively with poverty and promote 
economic and human development.472 
Although the OAU was aware of and recognized the fact that “freedom, 
equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the 
legitimate aspirations of the African peoples,”473 the Charter that brought the 
organization into being (OAU Charter or Charter) “did not specifically make 
the promotion of democracy and good governance one of its purposes or ob-
jectives.”474 Instead, the Charter required that Member States adhere to certain 
principles, including “[n]on-interference in the internal affairs of [member] 
States”475 and “respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each 
State and for its inalienable right to independent existence.”476 
These principles, which were binding on Member States, meant that the 
OAU, as a continental organization, “could not intervene to prevent extra-
constitutional regime changes, including military coups”477 and other threats 
 
 471 Org. of African Unity [OAU], OAU Charter, May 25, 1963, https://au.int/en/treaties/o 
au-charter-addis-ababa-25-may-1963. 
 472 Mbaku, supra note 33, at 83 (emphasis added). 
 473 OAU Charter, supra note 471, at pmbl. 
 474 Mbaku, supra note 33, at 83. 
 475 OAU Charter, supra note 471, at art. III(2). 
 476 Id. at art. III(3). 
 477 Mbaku, supra note 33, at 83. 
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to peace and security generally and the rule of law in particular. As argued by 
some scholars of African political economy, “it was obvious, even to a casual 
observer, that military coups were a direct affront and constraint to the mainte-
nance of the type of governance systems that promote many of the ideals (e.g., 
freedom, equality, and justice) that gave impetus to the founding of the 
OAU.”478 Perhaps, more importantly, military coups were and still are a major 
threat to constitutional government and the rule of law. But, how did the OAU 
deal with military coups and other threats to the rule of law? 
The policy of the OAU and that of its successor organization, the African 
Union (AU), towards military coups and other forms of unconstitutional 
change of government can be found in three important documents. The first 
instrument is the Lomé Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response 
to Unconstitutional Changes of Government (Lomé Declaration).479 The sec-
ond is the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (De-
mocracy Charter), which was adopted by the African Union at the Eighth Or-
dinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on January 
30, 2007 at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.480 The third instrument is the Constitutive 
Act of the African Union (Constitutive Act), which was signed in Lomé, Togo, 
on July 11, 2000.481 
The Lomé Declaration outlines four situations that OAU Member States 
had agreed could produce an unconstitutional change of government and these 
are: (1) military coup d’état against a democratically elected Government; (2) 
intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected Government; 
(3) replacement of democratically elected Governments by armed dissident 
groups and rebel movements; and (4) the refusal by an incumbent government 
to relinquish power to the winning party after free, fair, and regular elec-
tions.482 
While the Democracy Charter lists the same four situations that were elab-
orated in the Lomé Declaration, it provides for a fifth situation, which ad-
dresses changes to national constitutions that interfere with constitutional and 
democratic change of government: “Any amendment or revision of the 
 
 478 Id. at 83–84. 
 479 Org. of African Unity, Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Un-
constitutional Changes of Government, OAU Doc. AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI) (2000) [herein-
after Lomé Declaration]. 
 480 Org. of African Unity, African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, 
OAU Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.47 (VIII) (2007) [hereinafter Democracy Charter]. The De-
mocracy Charter came into effect on February 15, 2012. 
 481 Constitutive Act of the African Union, July 11, 2000, 2158 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 482 Lomé Declaration, supra note 479, at 3 (emphasis added). The Lomé Declaration, 
however, did not address the situation where it was necessary to intervene to replace a non-
democratic government. 
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constitution or legal instruments, which is an infringement on the principles 
of democratic change of government.”483 
In the context in which the expression is used in this article, a military coup 
d’état usually involves the “forceful removal from office of individuals who 
hold leadership positions in the polity’s political institutions.”484 A military 
coup can also be defined as “an irregular transfer of a state’s chief executive 
by the regular armed forces or internal security forces through the use (or 
threat) of force” that specifically excludes “nonmilitary irregular transfers 
such as cabinet reshufflings and palace coups that lack military participa-
tion.”485 
Although definitions of military coups d’état may differ, they all have one 
thing in common: they constitute an unconstitutional or non-democratic 
change of government and hence, represent a threat to the rule of law. In ad-
dition, military coups, even if they are bloodless—that is, they do not involve 
the loss of life—may unleash a series of actions that could lead to civil war or 
some form of violent sectarian conflict that can directly threaten the rule of 
law or, at the very least, interfere with the practice of constitutionalism. The 
military coup, being an unconstitutional change of government, is a direct 
threat to democratic governance and the rule of law, regardless of the inten-
tions of coup leaders.486 
 
 483 Democracy Charter, supra note 480, at art. 23(5). This principle implicates what has 
been referred to as the constitutional coup, where incumbent presidents change the consti-
tution in order to unconstitutionally extend their stay in power. See generally Mbaku, supra 
note 33 (examining the constitutional coup as a threat to democracy in Africa). 
 484 JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS AND REFORM IN AFRICA: THE PUBLIC CHOICE 
PERSPECTIVE 92 (1997). 
 485 See J. Craig Jenkins & Augustine J. Kposowa, Explaining Military Coups d’État: 
Black Africa, 1957–1984, 55 AM. SOC. REV. 861, 861 (1990). 
 486 Recall that since the Egyptian military coup of July 23, 1952, Africa’s coup leaders 
have claimed that their actions were motivated by the desire to rid their societies of incom-
petent and corrupt leaders and restore integrity and professionalism to the government. Yet, 
without exception, all of Africa’s military elites who have successfully overthrown their 
governments, including members of the Free Officers Movement who overthrew the gov-
ernment of King Farouk in Egypt in 1952, have not performed any better than the civilian 
regimes that they ousted. In fact, many of the military elites who have conducted successful 
military coups have gone on to establish what turned out to be extremely repressive and 
tyrannical regimes that have not only retarded economic development but have also stunted 
the deepening and institutionalization of democracy and the practice of constitutionalism. 
Perhaps, more important is the fact that it is difficult to find a situation in Africa where 
coup leaders successfully transitioned their countries to governance regimes underpinned 
by the rule of law. Examples of military regimes that have gone on to stunt political devel-
opment in their respective countries include the reign of terror unleashed on Nigerians by 
military rule (1966–1979, 1993–1999), on the people of the Democratic Republic of Congo 
by the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko (1965–1997), who seized power by military coup in 
1965, and on inhabitants of Togo by Gnassingbé Eyadéma (1967–2005). See generally JIMI 
PETERS, THE NIGERIAN MILITARY AND THE STATE (1997) (examining the role of the military 
in governance in Nigeria); OLAYIWOLA ABEGUNRIN, NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER 
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B. The OAU and the African Union and Efforts to Deal with Military Coups 
and Other Threats to the Rule of Law 
 
The OAU was officially disbanded on July 9, 2002 and replaced by the 
African Union.487 In this section of the paper we look closer at the position 
taken by the OAU and AU with respect to military coups and other unconsti-
tutional changes of government. Since coups are a threat to the rule of law, 
this section of the paper will also consider how the OAU and AU have dealt 
with their impact on the rule of law in Africa. 
Both the Lomé Declaration and the Democracy Charter provide the Afri-
can Union with a general framework to respond and deal with unconstitutional 
changes of government.488 Nevertheless, emphasis is placed on military coups 
to the neglect of other situations that produce unconstitutional changes of gov-
ernment, such as “constitutional coups.”489 It has been suggested that during 
the founding of the OAU, “many African leaders believed that military coups 
were the most pervasive of the four or five forms of extra-constitutional 
change of government.”490 Some scholars have argued, however, that some of 
Africa’s post-independence leaders, especially those who had come to power 
through military coups, were likely to consider the military coup as the most 
important threat to the survival of their regimes, much more so than other 
forms of unconstitutional change of government.491 Professor Victor T. Le 
Vine recognized the threat posed to the rule of law by the military coup when 
he stated that “it was the military regimes that epitomized the low state to 
which constitutionalism had fallen during [the] 1963–89” period in West Af-
rica.492 As evidenced by recent unconstitutional changes of government in 
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Egypt,493 Sudan494 and Zimbabwe,495 the military coup remains a serious 
threat to the rule of law in Africa. 
At this point in the analysis, one could ask why countries, such as the 
United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and many of today’s matured 
democracies, have managed to escape military coups, despite the fact that they 
have extremely strong militaries. The answer to this question lies in the fact 
that “all these countries have governing processes undergirded by separation 
of powers with effective checks and balances, which include [truly] independ-
ent judiciaries, robust civil societies, openness and transparency in govern-
ment communication, and free and independent media.”496 To preserve the 
rule of law or to establish it, each African country must strengthen, deepen 
and institutionalize its democracy generally and its democratic institutions in 
particular. That calls for institutional reforms that create the type of governing 
processes described above. 
But, what have been OAU/AU policy responses to military coups and 
other challenges to the rule of law? As stated in the Lomé Declaration, during 
the Thirty-Fifth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Gov-
ernment of the OAU, delegates “unanimously rejected any unconstitutional 
change as an unacceptable and anachronistic act, which is in contradiction of 
our commitment to promote democratic principles and conditions.”497 Chap-
ter 8 of the Democracy Charter prescribes sanctions that should be imposed 
on African countries and regimes that undertake unconstitutional changes of 
government.498 The Lomé Declaration also provides similar sanctions as those 
provided in the Democracy Charter. 
According to Article 25 of the Democracy Charter, whenever the AU’s 
Peace and Security Council determines that there has been “an unconstitu-
tional change of government in a State Party, and that diplomatic initiatives 
have failed, it shall suspend the said State Party from the exercise of its right 
to participate in the activities of the Union.”499 The suspension of such an 
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INDEP. (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2019/03/29/it-was-a-military- 
coup-obasanjo/ (examining the military coup that overthrew the government of Robert Ga-
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offending State Party is expected to “take effect immediately.”500 With respect 
to the perpetrators of the unconstitutional change of government (e.g., the mil-
itary elites who organized and carried out the coup), they are permanently 
banned from participating “in elections held to restore the democratic order or 
hold any position of responsibility in political institutions of their State.”501 In 
addition, “[p]erpetrators of unconstitutional change of government may also 
be tried before the competent court of the Union.”502 Other sanctions are pre-
scribed for Member States and perpetrators of unconstitutional change of gov-
ernment. According to Article 25(7), “[t]he Assembly [of AU Heads of State 
and Government] may decide to apply other forms of sanctions on perpetra-
tors of unconstitutional change of government including punitive economic 
measures.”503 
But, how have the OAU and the AU performed in their efforts to deal with 
unconstitutional change of government? Although Article 25 of the Democ-
racy Charter prohibits any individuals who have participated in an unconsti-
tutional change of government (e.g., a military coup) from “democratizing” 
themselves and becoming part of the post-coup civilian government, the OAU 
and the African Union have often not imposed sanctions on individuals who 
have done so and the regimes that they have subsequently formed. For exam-
ple, in 1979, then Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings of the Ghana Air Force, 
attempted but failed to overthrow the regime of [General] Fred Akuffo.504 
Rawlings was arrested by the Ghanaian military, tried and sentenced to death 
for the abortive coup.505 
However, during his court martial, Rawlings made declarations that en-
deared him to the Ghanaian public, especially those who were sick and tired 
of the country’s “corruption and social injustices under the SMC506 
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 504 See Ghana: What Will Rawlings Do?, AFR. CONFIDENTIAL (June 20, 1979), https://ww 
w.africa-confidential.com/special-report/id/26/What_will_Rawlings_do; see also Leon 
Dash, Jerry Rawlings Again Leads Military Seizure of Power in Ghana, WASH. POST (Jan, 
1, 1982), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/01/01/jerry-rawlings-ag 
ain-leads-military-seizure-of-power-in-ghana/47ebae98-3354-4e0e-81b9-cc9722e1a3bb/ 
(noting the overthrow of the government of Ghana by former Air Force officer Jerry Rawl-
ings). 
 505 See DAVID AFRIYIE DONKOR, SPIDERS OF THE MARKET: GHANAIAN TRICKSTER 
PERFORMANCE IN A WEB OF NEOLIBERALISM 39 (2016) (examining Jerry Rawlings’ trial for 
treason in Ghana); see also Nugent, infra note 510 (noting the trial of Rawlings for the 
failed coup against the government of General Akuffo in May 1979). 
 506 That is the regime of the Supreme Military Council (SMC), which lasted from October 
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regime.”507 At this time in the country’s history, many citizens of Ghana had 
come to associate the military and military rulers with “misrule and embez-
zlement than with courage and integrity.”508 On the other hand, they consid-
ered Rawlings a man of “courage and integrity” and hence, throughout his 
trial, the capital city was littered with posters with phrases, such as, “leave 
Rawlings alone,” “Rawlings is our man,” and “revolution or death.”509 On 
June 4, 1979, a group of soldiers, claiming that Ghana’s existing leadership 
was extremely corrupt, dysfunctional, and no longer able to effectively lead 
the country, attacked the military barracks where Rawlings was awaiting ex-
ecution and freed him. Rawlings subsequently led the group of soldiers that 
had freed him in a bloody coup that ousted the SMC and the Akuffo govern-
ment.510 
Shortly after the coup, Rawlings, who had been sprung from jail by junior 
officers, was made head of the fifteen-member Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council (AFRC), “which was an instrument of junior [military] officers and 
the lower ranks.”511 The AFRC, nevertheless, allowed the presidential elec-
tions that were scheduled for July 9, 1979 to proceed. They were won by 
“Hilla Limann’s People’s National Party (PNP)” and on September 24, 1979, 
Rawlings “formally handed over to Limman and returned to the barracks.”512 
Rawlings, however, grew increasingly interested in politics and “began to 
hang out at the campus of the University of Ghana where there was a 
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substantial body of leftwing intellectuals who helped him to give greater shape 
to his raw gut-feelings.”513 On September 24, 1979, power was peacefully 
handed over to President Hilla Limann of the People’s National Party 
(PNP).514 However, Rawlings, convinced that the Limann regime did not have 
the capacity and political will to deal effectively with the country’s multifari-
ous economic and political problems, overthrew the government on December 
31, 1981.515 
Shortly after the overthrow of Limann, Rawlings constituted the Provi-
sional National Defense Council (PNDC) as the country’s ruling body with 
him as the head.516 Rawlings’ PNDC drafted a new constitution, which was 
subsequently approved by referendum on April 28, 1992.517 That year, Rawl-
ings resigned from the military and together with the PNDC and its supporters, 
founded a political party called the National Democratic Congress (NDC).518 
He subsequently participated in and won the presidential elections that were 
held on November 3, 1992 and assumed the position of President of Ghana’s 
Fourth Republic.519 
The OAU, however, did not condemn Rawlings’s participation in the post-
coup democratic dispensation, nor did it suspend Ghana’s participation in its 
activities.520 Of course, one can argue that the decision by Rawlings to resign 
from the army and engage in civilian politics was undertaken before the OAU 
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and AU adopted the three documents related to unconstitutional change of 
government.521 
The OAU was founded in 1963 and it was not until the mid-1990s that the 
organization began to seriously consider adopting a continent-wide uniform 
policy for dealing with unconstitutional change of government, including mil-
itary coups.522 Eki Yemisi Omorogbe states that “[t]he turning point”523 in the 
OAU’s attitude towards military coups and other forms of unconstitutional 
regime change came after the overthrow of the democratically-elected gov-
ernment of Tejan Kabbah in Sierra Leone.524 Kabbah was elected president of 
Sierra Leone as part of the post-war reconstruction process.525 However, on 
May 25, 1997, his government was overthrown by Major Johnny Paul 
Koromah.526 When the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government 
met in Harare, Zimbabwe, during the period May 28–31, 1997, delegates ad-
dressed the coup in Sierra Leone, called for a return to “constitutional govern-
ment” and “encouraged the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) to achieve that goal.”527 Delegates at the Harare summit “strongly 
and unequivocally” condemned the military coup d’état “which took place in 
Sierra Leone on 25 May, 1997” and called for the “immediate restoration of 
constitutional order.”528 Finally, the delegates called on all African countries 
and the international community not to recognize the new regime and to re-
frain from “lending support in any form whatsoever to the perpetrators of the 
coup d’état.”529 
The military government of Koromah, however, was ousted in February 
1998 by an ECOWAS military force named ECOMOG (Economic Commu-
nity of West African States Monitoring Group) and Kabbah’s regime was re-
stored.530 This time, it appears, the OAU, working with the regional group, 
ECOWAS, had succeeded in restoring constitutional government after 
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military intervention. The OAU then turned to situations in Comoros, Repub-
lic of Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea Bissau, and Niger, where there had been 
military coups since the Harare summit and declared that all these countries 
should restore “constitutional legality before the [2000] Summit.”531 
In Lomé, Togo, in July 2000, the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government adopted the first of three instruments that were designed specif-
ically to deal with unconstitutional change of government—the Declaration 
on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Gov-
ernment.532 As argued by Mbaku, “[t]he events in Sierra Leone, thus, provided 
the impetus to the unequivocal condemnation and rejection of the military 
coup and other forms of unconstitutional regime changes on the continent.”533 
There have been arguments that some military coups are actually good and 
that they can rid a country of recalcitrant, corrupt, opportunistic, tyrannical, 
and dysfunctional regimes. For example, Paul Colier, a well-known econo-
mist who studies African political economy, has argued that “[a] truly bad 
government in a developing country is more likely to be replaced by a coup 
than by an election.”534 However, the idea or proposition that “some coups are 
acceptable, and therefore could be said to be good coups, whereas others are 
not acceptable, and are therefore bad coups,” poses a lot of challenges to an-
yone interested in eliminating threats to the rule of law in the continent. First, 
most of the post-coup regimes that have been established in African countries 
during the last several decades have generally been opportunistic and have 
failed to successfully transition their countries to constitutional government 
and the rule of law.535 Second, many of Africa’s military coups have stunted 
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the potential of many countries to develop constitutional governments—in 
fact, many of these continue to suffer today from the damage done to them by 
military coups and have not been able to establish and sustain rule of law re-
gimes. These countries include Algeria, Benin Republic, Burkina Faso, Bu-
rundi, Chad, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Democratic Re-
public of Congo, Egypt, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, 
Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, 
Uganda, and Zimbabwe.536 
Naison Ngoma has argued that although the “military has a certain contri-
bution to make towards the development of a state, this contribution has not 
always been successful.”537 In fact, military intervention in African politics 
has not only failed to improve governance in Africa but has actually stunted 
the development of governing processes undergirded by the rule of law.538 
Since “unconstitutional regime changes have usually led to or produced un-
constitutional regimes, . . . military coups and other unconstitutional ap-
proaches to regime change cannot lead to the deepening and institutionaliza-
tion of democracy” in Africa.539 
Despite the African Union’s uniform policy on unconstitutional change of 
government, the continental organization has not always provided a uniform 
response to situations involving military coups and other forms of unconstitu-
tional regime change. Granted, the OAU acted firmly to restore democracy in 
Sierra Leone after the military coup that overthrew the government of Tejan 
Kabbah in 1997.540 Nevertheless, when, for example, Joseph Kabila refused 
to step down after his term as President of the Democratic Republic of Congo 
had ended, the AU did not impose sanctions on him and his regime.541 Kabila 
came to power in the DRC after the assassination of his father, Laurent-Désiré 
Kabila, who had overthrown the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko and taken con-
trol of the government.542 He was subsequently elected president in 2006 and 
re-elected in 2011 for a second and final term that was supposed to expire on 
December 19, 2016.543 
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The DRC scheduled presidential elections for November 27, 2016 to select 
a successor to Joseph Kabila. However, before the elections could take place, 
the country’s electoral authority (Commission électorale nationale indépen-
dante—CENI), which was controlled by Kabila’s government, postponed the 
elections, arguing that the country did not have enough money to carry out a 
credible election and that it did not have an accurate electoral register.544 Ka-
bila effectively manipulated the country’s national institutions to unconstitu-
tionally extend his presidential mandate for over two years.545 Yet, the AU did 
not impose any sanctions on Kabila and his unconstitutional behavior. 
On July 4, 2013, the Egyptian military overthrew the democratically-
elected government of Mohamed Morsi.546 The military coup was led by Gen-
eral Abdel Fattah el-Sisi who went on to become the 6th President of Egypt.547 
The AU initially condemned the coup as “an unconstitutional change of gov-
ernment and subsequently suspended Egypt’s participation in AU activi-
ties.”548 However, after a presidential election was held between May 26 and 
28, 2014, which resulted in the election of el-Sisi as president, the AU lifted 
the suspension. By doing so, the AU failed to apply Article 25(4) of the De-
mocracy Charter, which states that “[t]he perpetrators of unconstitutional 
change of government shall not be allowed to participate in elections held to 
restore the democratic order or hold any position of responsibility in political 
institutions of their State.”549 
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who had participated in the post-coup presidential 
election as a candidate for the presidency, was the leader of the military coup 
that overthrew a democratically-elected government. As required by AU prin-
ciples, el-Sisi should have been sanctioned for participating in post-coup elec-
tions designed to restore democratic order and for holding a position of re-
sponsibility in the government.550 As argued by Mbaku, “[t]he decision by the 
AU to recognize [el-Sisi’s] government and lift Egypt’s suspension signifi-
cantly undermined the AU’s legitimacy and ability to consistently deal with 
unconstitutional changes of government”551 and promote the rule of law in the 
continent. 
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As if to confirm how toothless and dysfunctional the AU has become, es-
pecially when it comes to the enforcement of its own directives, at the AU 
Summit in Addis Ababa on February 10, 2019, delegates elected el-Sisi Chair-
man of the African Union.552 Human rights groups, including Amnesty Inter-
national, condemned the elevation of el-Sisi to the chairmanship of the AU 
and noted that “[d]uring his time in power President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has 
demonstrated a shocking contempt for human rights. Under his leadership the 
country has undergone a catastrophic decline in rights and freedoms.”553 
Earlier, this article discussed the constitutional coup as a major constraint 
to constitutionalism and the rule of law in Africa. Even though the AU has 
recognized the constitutional coup as a situation constituting an unconstitu-
tional change of government, it has never imposed sanctions on individuals 
who have engaged in such behaviors or the governmental regimes formed by 
them. Article 23(5) of the Democracy Charter states as follows: 
State Parties agree that the use of, inter alia, the following il-
legal means of accessing or maintaining power constitute an 
unconstitutional change of government and shall draw appro-
priate sanctions of the Union: 5. Any amendment or revision 
of the constitution or legal instruments, which is an infringe-
ment on the principles of democratic change of government.554 
Take, for example, the case of President Paul Biya of Cameroon. He be-
came President of the Republic of Cameroon on November 6, 1982 when the 
country’s first president voluntarily resigned the office.555 At the time, Biya 
was the country’s Prime Minister and succeeded Ahidjo as required by the 
country’s constitution.556 On December 19, 1990, Biya formally legalized 
multiparty politics in Cameroon.557 The first presidential election after multi-
party politics were legalized took place on October 11, 1992 and Biya 
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emerged victorious to serve a five-year term as president.558 He won re-elec-
tion in 1997.559 
However, Cameroon’s constitution was amended in 1996, introducing 
term limits for presidents—the president was limited to two seven-year 
terms.560 Thus, if Biya was successfully re-elected in the presidential election 
scheduled for October 11, 2004, he was constitutionally required to leave of-
fice at the end of his mandate in 2011. Any effort by him to change the con-
stitution and stay in the office beyond 2011 would have constituted a violation 
of Article 23(5) of the AU’s Democracy Charter since that would have been 
a “revision of the constitution . . . which is an infringement on the principles 
of democratic change of government.”561 The AU, then, would have been re-
quired, as mandated by the Democracy Charter and other instruments, to im-
pose sanctions on Biya and his regime. 
In 2008 and in anticipation of the presidential election scheduled for Oc-
tober 9, 2011, Biya had the constitution changed so that he could run for an-
other term in office.562 This was a direct violation of the provisions of Article 
23(5) of the Democracy Charter. Yet, the AU neither condemned the action 
nor imposed any sanctions on Biya and his regime. Biya continued his legal 
manipulations to stay in office and in 2018, he won re-election for another 
seven-year term and will potentially remain in office until 2025.563 
With the help of the constitutional coup, Biya has been able to remain in 
power indefinitely and in the process, he has stunted Cameroon’s transition to 
democratic governance and the rule of law. Many scholars of Cameroon po-
litical economy have termed the regime of Paul Biya “illegitimate [and] 
rights-abusive” and commented that even though the country is “technically a 
multiparty democracy, the reality is far from democratic.”564 Others have in-
cluded him among the world’s most enduring dictators.565 
Other African presidents who have used constitutional coups to frustrate 
their countries’ transitions to governing processes undergirded by the rule of 
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law include: Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, who has been in power since 1986 
and has changed the constitution to eliminate both term and age limits for 
presidents;566 Pierre Nkurunziza of Burundi, who had the constitution 
changed in 2018 allowing him to potentially remain in office until 2034;567 
Iddris Déby of Chad, who engineered a 2018 constitutional amendment that 
could allow him to stay in power until 2033;568 Paul Kagame of Rwanda, who 
amended the constitution in 2015 to allow himself to potentially remain in 
office until 2034;569 and Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who ruled Algeria from 1999 
until he was ousted by a popular revolt in April 2019.570 All these presidents 
used constitutional coups to extend their mandates and in doing so, effectively 
stunted efforts to develop and sustain a governing process undergirded by ad-
herence to the rule of law. 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Recent studies show that extreme poverty continues to plague many Afri-
can countries and that countries, like Nigeria, which are endowed with 
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significant amounts of natural resources, including oil and gas, have large 
populations of people living in extreme poverty.571 In fact, despite its oil 
wealth, Nigeria has surpassed India as the country with the largest number of 
people living in extreme poverty.572 
Many scholars have studied the causes of poverty and underdevelopment 
in Africa. Some of these studies have concluded that persistent poverty in the 
continent can be attributed to several factors, including “pervasive military 
intervention in governance; natural disasters; excessive and unmanageable 
population growth; political violence and destructive ethnic conflict; depend-
ence on the industrial West for development assistance, food aid and loans; 
political and bureaucratic corruption; and excessive exploitation of the conti-
nent’s environmental resources.”573 In addition, it has also been argued that 
pervasive poverty in the continent can be blamed on “policy mistakes made 
by well-meaning but incompetent and ill-informed policymakers.”574 
Over the years, many development economists and other scholars of Afri-
can political economy have suggested that the most effective way to eradicate 
poverty in Africa and improve human development is for each country to 
bring into its governance system “more competent, better trained, honest, 
highly ethical and disciplined individuals” in an effort to “reduce public mal-
feasance and venality, increase bureaucratic efficiency, and improve govern-
ance and the allocation of resources.”575 Nevertheless, many of these recom-
mendations were considered questionable because even countries that had 
made a concerted effort to significantly improve their civil services remain 
pervaded with corruption and were still unable to create the wealth that they 
need to fight poverty. 
However, in 1996, economist Mancur Olson published a seminal paper in 
which he argued that natural resource endowments, as well as the availability 
of a highly-educated and skilled workforce, were not a necessary precondition 
for development.576 Olson went on to argue that it is the quality of a country’s 
institutions and its public policies that are critical to economic growth and 
development.577 As has been determined by other scholars, the poor economic 
performance and the failure of many African countries to deal fully and 
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effectively with poverty is due to the existence, in these countries, of ex-
tremely weak and dysfunctional institutions.578 
It is true that African policymakers and civil servants have made their share 
of mistakes. However, all available evidence points to political opportunism 
on the part of civil servants and political elites as the most important explana-
tion for continued poverty in the continent.579 In fact, many of Africa’s post-
independence leaders have actually promoted policies that have enriched them 
but have impoverished their fellow citizens.580 In research published in 2004, 
Rod Alence determined that “democratic institutions systematically enhance 
African states’ performance as agents of development.”581 In a recent study 
on the relationship between the rule of law and development in Africa, Joseph 
Isanga argues that “Africa’s economic growth needs to be premised on the 
intrinsic and inseparable relationship and synergy between rule of law and 
sustainable economic growth, a proposition that African law and judicial in-
stitutions are not properly recognizing.”582 He concludes that in order for Af-
rican countries to achieve sustainable economic and human development, it is 
necessary that each country “continue to develop institutions dedicated to 
good governance and the rule of law.”583 N. A. Curott argues that: 
The Rule of Law, by providing the framework for protecting 
private property and individual freedom, creates the stability 
and predictability in economic affairs necessary to promote 
entrepreneurship, saving and investment, and capital for-
mation. It is nonsensical to expect . . . economic development 
in Africa without addressing the institutional factors, such as 
the lack of Rule of Law, which are responsible for Africa’s fail-
ure to develop in the first place.584 
A 2012 declaration by the High-level Meeting of the [UN] General As-
sembly on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels (UNGA 
Declaration) stated that: 
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[T]he rule of law and development are strongly interrelated 
and mutually reinforcing, that the advancement of the rule of 
law at the national and international levels is essential for sus-
tained and inclusive economic growth, sustainable develop-
ment, the eradication of poverty and hunger and the full reali-
zation of all human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
including the right to development, all of which in turn rein-
force the rule of law, and for this reason we are convinced that 
this interrelationship should be considered in the post-2015 in-
ternational development agenda.585 
The UNGA Declaration went on to state that “[w]e recognize the im-
portance of fair, stable and predictable legal frameworks for generating inclu-
sive, sustainable and equitable development, economic growth and employ-
ment, generating investment and facilitating entrepreneurship.”586 It is now 
generally agreed by many scholars of development that it is very difficult and 
virtually impossible to advance inclusive economic growth and development 
in a country in which the majority of citizens do not voluntarily accept and 
respect the law. It has been argued that the failure to effectively manage eth-
nocultural diversity is a major threat to peace and security in Africa.587 The 
solution lies in providing each African country with governing processes that 
deal effectively with the challenges posed by ethnocultural diversity—such a 
governing process would prevent majoritarian tyranny and allow each subcul-
ture to maximize its values without preventing others from acting similarly. 
Such a governing process is one that is undergirded by the rule of law. Hence, 
making certain that the rule of law functions effectively in each African coun-
try is the key to peaceful coexistence and sustainable development in the con-
tinent.588 
Although the rule of law “is a critical catalyst to Africa’s effort to deal 
effectively with poverty,”589 many countries on the continent are presently 
unable to provide themselves with an effective rule-of-law regime. This is due 
to several challenges, some of which have been examined in this article. These 
challenges include, but are not limited to, government impunity, military in-
tervention in governance, manipulation of national constitutions by presidents 
in order to remain in power indefinitely, political interference with the judici-
ary or lack of judicial independence, failure of the majority of citizens in each 
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African country to understand and appreciate the constitution and its role in 
their lives, failure to domesticate international human rights instruments, and 
extreme poverty and political and economic exclusion. These threats to the 
rule of law can only be eliminated through democratic (inclusive, participa-
tory, bottom-up, and people-driven) constitution-making that produces con-
stitutions and governing processes undergirded by separation of powers with 
checks and balances. The latter must include a truly independent judiciary, a 
bicameral legislature, with each chamber empowered to exercise an absolute 
veto over legislation passed by the other; and an independent and competent 
executive. Considering the important role played by civil society and its or-
ganizations in checking the exercise of government power, the governing pro-
cess must be one that guarantees openness and transparency in government 
communication so that civil society and its organizations (e.g., a free and in-
dependent press) can have relatively easy access to the information that they 
need to check the government. 
 
